Why do diamonds sell for such high prices? Why do pre-owned diamonds typically sell for such low prices?
In: Operations Management
As Tom Montgomery, how would you convince the De Beers Executive Committee to launch IIDV as a standalone business unit?
In: Operations Management
1.2 Please give the example of the compensation package that you would like to provide to Manager and Director position
Manager Position
Direct Financial Compensation |
Indirect Financial Compensation |
Non-Financial Compensation |
In: Operations Management
In the class we discussed three types of performance: In-role task performance, organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), and counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs).
For this extra-credit assignment (this is only an opportunity, not a mandatory assignment), think about your performance to be a successful student in our HRM class. Explain how you can be a high performer in this class regarding each of the three dimensions of performance. Like we did in class for the example of a restaurant server, for each dimension, write down 5 specific ways (1-2 sentences per way) in which you can be a high performer in this class.
In: Operations Management
Subject: Legal, Ethical and Social Environment
Question: What are the requirements to obtain a trademark? What federal acts regulate obtaining trademarks?
In: Operations Management
Team Case #3: Rural Utility
Your consulting team has been brought in by the Board chairperson to assist an organization in developing a key leader. The Board is concerned with Audrey, the current senior executive of their rural public utility company with 185 employees. The company is 76% male and 24% female, and their previous executive, Hugh Davis (who retired), had a very collaborative leadership style – a real contrast from Audrey, who is very task-focused and directive. The average employee tenure is 9 years, and many have been here 12 or more years. Audrey has been in her position for about 18 months now, having been recruited by the Board from outside the organization. It was a shock to many employees that she was hired, because many believed Jake, one of their managers, should be given that role (Jake is no longer with the organization, having accepted a new opportunity elsewhere two months after Audrey began).
Audrey has extensive experience with a similar organization in a much larger metro area, though she left her previous leadership position – which she held for 12 years – under a cloud of rumors about an affair with a colleague. Since her arrival, her employees seem to be split between those who support her completely and those who believe she was a major hiring mistake.
Over the past year, several employees (including several managers) have been contacting Board members complaining about Audrey’s performance. Board members are aware of the declining morale among both managers and employees, and are concerned that the organization has lost many valuable people in the past year. They have heard that even more are actively looking for a new workplace.
The Board has done some investigating on their own and have heard the following:
Audrey believes she has a collaborative approach to working with her managers, but you have learned that many of them see her as arrogant, rude, condescending, and domineering, and sometimes over-stepping her authority by taking actions without consulting the Board. Others believe she does not listen to their point of view and takes credit for their work.
Board members are tired of people calling or emailing them to complain about her. They would like to retain her because of her technical expertise and business acumen. However, they are considering terminating her because of the negativity she has aroused.
The Board has hired your team to advise them. What seems to be going on here, resulting in increased turnover and low morale? What might account for the differences of opinion as described by employees? And most importantly, what will you recommend (e.g., actions, development opportunities) to help this organization and increase Audrey’s leadership capacity (though she believes she needs no help and people should just get used to the fact that she leads differently than Hugh)? Be specific in your recommendations, and be sure to back them up with evidence.
B. Based on your analysis, determine a course of action to address the challenges as comprehensively as you can. o Identify recommended actions. o For each recommendation made, provide the rationale (evidence-based) and a statement as to what will likely result from this recommended action (what problem(s) it will help to resolve). o If there are potential risks or unintended consequences of a particular course of action, make this explicit and indicate further actions that may help mitigate this risk.
In: Operations Management
The top three global automobile manufactures in 2015 were Toyota (10.23 million units), Volkswagen (10.14 million units), and General Motors (9.92 million units).1 Senior leaders at Volkswagen (VW) had a vision of global dominance and were determined to overtake Toyota and become the world’s number one auto manufacturer. Company leaders identified diesel vehicles as a key means for reaching this goal and realizing their vision. Volkswagen has long been known around the world for its diesel vehicles, and executives saw this as an advantage over its competitors. Moreover, diesel vehicles were attractive to customers because “They were cheaper than hybrids and packed more muscle under the hood yet still often got more than 40 miles to the gallon.”2 A major obstacle, however, was challenging emissions standards in the United States. The U.S. standards were always stringent, more so than Europe, but in 2004 were tightened dramatically. VW nevertheless decided to take on the challenge and pressed ahead, diligently attempting to innovate its designs and technologies and meet these standards. VW’s competitors (Mazda, Nissan, Honda, and Hyundai), in contrast, found the standards too difficult and chose not to compete in the American diesel car market.3
VW, which also owns Porsche and Audi, applied its renowned engineering and innovation expertise to overcome the emissions hurdles. In this instance, however, effective solutions did not materialize in time and within budget. But what did emerge was a way to cheat. Engineers at the company’s research and development complex in Wolfsburg Germany identified patterns of parameters associated with emission testing (steering, throttle, and other operations). They then used these patterns to program software to switch a car’s emission equipment into a “cheat mode” when testing conditions were detected. The software became known as “cheat devices” and would switch back to normal mode when in non-testing (typical) driving conditions. (For perspective, the normal operation mode produced emissions that were up to 40 times the legal limit!)4
This begs the question: Why not simply operate in this mode all of the time? Several reasons. Compared to the normal operation mode, engine and mileage performance were substantially reduced. Engineers also determined that running cars full time in this stricter emissions mode would wear out components much faster. Adding to these challenges, alternative and more effective emission equipment would cost hundreds of dollars more per vehicle without providing noticeable performance benefits to customers. The alternatives actually would have decreased the impressive engine and fuel performance that attracted buyers in the first place. All of this was deemed unacceptable by senior decision-makers and the cheat devices were installed for nearly a decade in millions of vehicles sold around the world.5
The Costs Continue to Mount
Since the discovery and subsequent admission of the scandal in 2015 the consequences and costs have piled up. Approximately 11 million cars worldwide—roughly 500,000 cars in the United States and 8.5 in Europe—are now involved.6 One analyst estimates the cost to VW could ultimately exceed $86 billion.7 By late 2016 legal liability alone had already reached $19 billion:
The scandal also has damaged the reputation of the company with customers, investors, auto dealers, and regulators around the world. For instance, one survey in 2016 showed that consumers were 28 percent less likely to buy a VW because of the scandal.10 Although many costs are difficult to estimate, and some are likely to linger far beyond legal claims and settlements, the effect on sales was immediate. VW vehicle sales in the United States dropped nearly 15 percent in the first six months of 2016, compared to the same period a year earlier,11 and operating profits at passenger car unit were down more than 45 percent.12 To be fair, VW sales were lagging in the United States before the scandal but have since accelerated. This was especially problematic for VW considering that more than 20 percent of its total U.S. sales were from diesel vehicles.13 These troubles were further reflected in the company’s stock which at one point dipped by as much as 40 percent, and more than a year later is still down 25 percent from prescandal levels.14
An Overlooked Casualty
Besides VW executives and employees one group is especially hard hit by the scandal and often overlooked—auto dealers! The scandal has caused inventories at VW, as well as Porsche and Audi (both had numerous vehicle models included in the scandal), dealerships to be more difficult to move. A class action suit by 650 U.S. VW dealers resulted in a reported $1.2 billion settlement. But the fact is they have many new and used cars that cannot be sold due to “stop-sale orders.”15 Even models not included in the scandal are more difficult to sell (sitting on lots 71 percent longer). Combine these factors with aggressive discounting by the company means that dealers have and will continue to suffer.16
How and Why Did This Happen?
The answer to this question is not simple. Although current Volkswagen chairman, Hans Dieter Potsch, highlighted the complexity and magnitude of the scandal and its causes. He explained that when engineers couldn’t find technical solutions within the prescribed timeframe and budget, they developed and opted to use a shortcut. Worse still, it was reported that “When the engineers did find a solution, he said, they chose to keep on cheating rather than employ it… ‘We are not talking about a one-off mistake, but a whole chain of mistakes that was not interrupted at any point along the timeline.’”17
The Role of People and the Organization
Numerous executives, other leaders, managers, and employees throughout the organization clearly engaged in persistent unethical conduct. One explanation for the pervasive misconduct is that many of these same people possessed common values, such as conformity, tradition, and security. These would not only be personal values but also those long associated with Volkswagen, fostered by the company’s long history and place in German society and culture. This conservation orientation clearly pervaded individual employees and the larger organization so much so that one group of New York Times reporters stated: “The 78-year-old company’s unusual culture—confident, cutthroat, and insular—has come under scrutiny as potentially enabling Volkswagen’s lawbreaking behavior.”18 It thus is clear that the organization’s culture played a significant role, especially given the scandal permeated so many units, levels, and brands of the organization, and persisted over such a long period of time.
These values were reinforced by VW’s structure and executive leadership. VW is headquartered in Wolfsburg Germany, one of the country’s richest cities. A Newsweek article reports that employees of the company “live and work under a highly centralized hierarchy that expects him to perform, no matter what the demands.” Ferdinand Dudenhoffer, an automotive industry expert based in Germany, claims that VW is a unique auto company. “It’s not democratic; it’s autocratic. It’s a system focused on its roots in Wolfsburg. It’s not at all global in its thinking.” The culture is well known for discouraging debate and dissent. Dudenhoffer also asserts that although management may not have explicitly directed employees to do something unethical or illegal, they likely applied significant pressure by saying something like: “Please think again on that, and if you don’t find a solution, we may need to find another engineer.”19 This account suggests that pressure, both overt and subtle forms, was a common tool leaders and managers used to get compliance from employees at all levels. Over time, these factors undoubtedly served to strengthen the culture and employees’ compliance.
Other Causes
Senior leaderships’ vision for dominance and associated lofty goals for the diesel car market, were apparent in many ways over a long period of time. Evidence for its win at any cost approach occurred at least as far back as 2006. It was then that a VW technology executive gave a PowerPoint presentation that outlined how the automaker could cheat and pass emissions standards in the United States. Investigations have yet to determine how widely the information in this presentation was shared, but it does show that a series of flawed decisions over a long period of time contributed. This was exacerbated by the centralized decision-making practices at the company. The record now shows that for more than a decade leaders across levels at Volkswagen either ignored, underplayed, or actively covered up warning signs.20 This detail was described in a statement by Matthias Müller, who replaced Winterkorn as CEO after the scandal broke, but who has since been implicated himself. He contended that decision making was and is too centralized at the top, where a triumvirate of forces have too much power: (1) Porsche family members who developed the original VW Beetle, (2) the German state government in Saxony (the location of many VW factories that employ a large percentage of the workforce), and (3) labor representatives that control half the seats on the company’s supervisory board. He also argues that top-down power structure and leadership style under Mr. Winterkorn was detrimental to the company’s competitiveness.21
All the Blame Does Not Reside in the C-Suite
Certainly senior leadership deserves a large portion of the blame, as it set such challenging goals, enacted controlling leadership and decision-making styles, downplayed potential implications, and acted slowly and inadequately once the scandal was revealed. However, contributing to this was the long history Volkswagen had with the German government and regulators. The company is an iconic brand in the country and a major employer, which provided them many benefits and concessions from the government, investors, and regulators over time. It thus is possible that VW leaders may have expected regulators and others to bend the rules in favor of the organization.
These decision-making and leadership issues were reinforced by human resource policies and practices that either encouraged unethical behavior or at least didn’t hold people accountable for such transgressions. Making matters worse was VW’s bonus system that rewards consensus and rewards it generously. Employees are paid for individual performance and company performance, but it also rewards team performance.22 The implication is that blowing the whistle on something so significant would likely hit every employee in the pocketbook three times—individual, team, and company bonuses. Although many outsiders find it shocking, little financial consequence has occurred for the executives involved. While Winterkorn resigned, he still received a very generous severance package in excess of $10 million. And more generally executive bonus pay was only reduced by 30 percent with little explanation provided for the public record. This motivated one reporter to ask: “Why not reduce it by 100 percent?!”23
When combined these factors provided little encouragement for employees or executives to speak up, speak out, or take other actions.
How Many People Were Involved?
VW is not a monolith, it is comprised of nearly 600,000 employees. Of course not all of them were involved, but a sole actor was not behind the deception at VW. The scandal was a concert. Many individuals at all levels of VW and over many years clearly perceived risks to be lower than they actually were. This is due to the fact that vehicles often have over 50 different computers on board, which amounts to millions of lines of code. One expert said, “It’s impossible for any one of us to look over the whole thing, even if we wanted to.” The cheat software was buried within millions of lines of code—difficult to find even if you know how and where to look.24 Many also clearly showed trust in their own decisions and abilities, as well as those of their coworkers, supervisors, and senior leaders. It thus seems that the actions of VW’s executive leaders over time in a way legitimized the behaviors and diminished many employees’ concerns.
Volkswagen has taken a number of steps to determine the involvement of employees. One example was a limited amnesty program that offered some measure of job protection to a certain group of employees. Approximately 50 employees came forward and admitted knowledge of the activities related to the emissions cheating. Outside observers however claim that a significant number of engineers, technicians and managers would be required to coordinate all of the activities involved in identifying the problem, creating the solution, and implementing it. As one EPA official said, there are many different components, and the code could in theory be written by a single person, “but making it work with other parts of the engine is a more complicated task that would likely have involve more people.”25
If this isn’t bad enough, it is been revealed that Robert Bosch GmbH, a German company and the world’s largest automotive supplier, actually wrote part of the code. They however claim that it is not their responsibility how their customers use the products that they supply. Moreover, the company says it warned VW in 2007 not to use the software in real-world driving conditions as it would/could be illegal.
Assume VW hired consultants to advise them on the best way to implement change after the emissions scandal. The consultants recommended that VW senior management focus on inputs, strategic plans, target elements of change, and outputs. Based on what you’ve learned in the book, what model or framework are the consultants describing?
Multiple Choice
organizational development
organizing framework
Kotter’s steps for leading organizational change
Lewin’s change model
systems model of change
In: Operations Management
What does the organization’s path along the quality continuum tell us?
In: Operations Management
1) In a service system with impatient customers, is 1/a (1/interarrival time) the same as the flow rate? please explain.
In: Operations Management
Consider the following linear programming problem.
min −x1 + 4x2
subject to:
• x1 + x2 ≥ 1
• 3x1 + x2 ≤ .5
• x1, x2 ≥ 0
Formulate the dual of this problem.
In: Operations Management
1.1 Discuss challenges related to managing performance and compensating employees from other countries.
Give some incidents and examples
In: Operations Management
magine that you were just now put in charge of designing and leading a major strategic change effort. Your organization has been suffering from poor performance, it's getting worse, and you've diagnosed and recommended a strategic change to fix the underlying issues and improve performance. What are the first five things you would do? Briefly explain why these are the first five 'to dos'
In: Operations Management
Price indicates and reflects product value, prestige, quality, etc. It needs to fit with the brand and image and make sense for the target market. there are many different ways to price like bundling or freemium or subscription or odd pricing and more. Do some online searching and find a business with a unique pricing structure. Discuss why or why not you think the strategy is a good idea.
**site source**
In: Operations Management
why is the marketing plan one of the most important elements of the marketing process? Be specific. Provide an example.
In: Operations Management
1-What is culture? What are the most important factors in creating a culture?
2-Do you think cultures are becoming more alike? Is it a good thing or a bad thing? Give reasons?
In: Operations Management