Lynn et al., (2012). Dissociation and dissociative disorders: Challenging conventional wisdom

The current (fourth) edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) defines dissociation as “a disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 519). Many psychologists and psychiatrists view dissociation as a coping mechanism designed to deal with overpowering stress (Dell & O’Neil, 2009). One well-known form of dissociation is depersonalization, in which individuals feel disconnected from themselves; they may feel like an automaton or feel as if they are watching themselves from a distance. Another is derealization, in which individuals feel disconnected from reality; they may feel as though they are in a dream or that things seem to be moving in slow motion. Steven Spielberg’s 1998 film, Saving Private Ryan, vividly depicts an episode of derealization (spoiler alert): After being shot, Captain John Miller (portrayed by Tom Hanks) witnesses the events around him unfolding as if in a silent, slow-motion movie. Certain forms of dissociation are widespread in the general population; for example, most estimates suggest that nearly 50% of individuals have experienced depersonalization at some point in their lives (Aderibigbe, Bloch, & Walker, 2001). When mild and intermittent, such symptoms are rarely of clinical concern. Nevertheless, in some cases, dissociation may take the form of grossly impairing dissociative disorders. These puzzling conditions include dissociative identity disorder (DID), formerly known as multiple personality disorder, dissociative fugue, and depersonalization disorder. In the best known dissociative disorder, DID, individuals supposedly develop multiple coexisting personalities, known as “alters.” In dissociative fugue, individuals purportedly suddenly forget their past, travel from home or work (fugue has the same root as fugitive), and adopt a new identity; in depersonalization disorder, individuals experience frequent bouts of depersonalization, derealization, or both. Dissociation also features prominently in other psychological conditions not formally classified as dissociative disorders, such as panic disorder, borderline and schizotypal personality disorders, and posttraumatic stress disorder. The origins of dissociation are poorly understood. Nevertheless, the clinical literature on dissociation has been marked by three widely accepted assumptions associated with what is often referred to as the posttraumatic model. Specifically, it has long been assumed that chronic dissociation is (a) a coping mechanism to deal with intense stressors, especially childhood sexual and physical trauma; (b) accompanied by cognitive deficits that interfere with the processing of emotionally laden information; and (c) marked by an avoidant informationprocessing style characterized by a tendency to forget painful memories. The coping mechanism outlined in (a) is typically assumed to play a key causal role in dissociative disorders. For example, many authors have argued that DID reflects individuals’ attempts to “compartmentalize” and obtain psychological distance from traumatic experiences such as child abuse (Dell & O’Neil, 2009). In this article, we review recent research that calls these widespread assumptions into question and proposes novel and scientifically supported approaches for conceptualizing dissociation and dissociative disorders.

The Posttraumatic Model The posttraumatic model (Bremner, 2010; Gleaves, 1996) is ostensibly supported by very high rates—sometimes exceeding 90%—of reported histories of childhood trauma, most commonly child sexual abuse, among patients with DID and perhaps other dissociative disorders (Gleaves, 1996; Simeon, Guralnik, Schmeidler, Sirof, & Knutelska, 2001). Nevertheless, a number of authors (e.g., Giesbrecht, Lynn, Lilienfeld, & Merckelbach, 2008, 2010; Kihlstrom, 2005; Merckelbach & Muris, 2001; Piper & Merskey, 2004; Spanos, 1994, 1996) have questioned the oft-cited link between child abuse/ maltreatment and dissociation for several reasons. First, in most studies (e.g., Ross & Ness, 2010), objective corroboration of abuse is lacking. Second, the overwhelming majority of studies of self-reported trauma and dissociation are based on cross-sectional designs that do not permit causal inferences; in these designs, individuals are typically assessed for DID or other dissociative disorders and asked to recollect whether they had been abused or neglected in childhood. Prospective studies that circumvent the pitfalls of such retrospective reporting often fail to substantiate a link between childhood abuse and dissociation in adulthood (Giesbrecht et al., 2008; but see Bremner, 2010). Third, researchers have rarely controlled for overlapping conditions or symptoms, such as those of anxiety, eating, and personality disorders, raising the possibility that the correlates of abuse are not specific to dissociative disorders. Fourth, the reported high levels of child abuse among DID patients may be attributable to selection and referral biases (Pope & Hudson, 1995); for example, individuals with dissociative disorders may be especially likely to enter treatment if they are struggling with problems stemming from early abuse. Fifth, correlations between abuse and psychopathology decrease substantially or disappear when participants’ perception of family pathology is controlled statistically (Nash, Hulsey, Sexton, Harralson, & Lambert, 1993), which could mean that this association is due to global familial maladjustment rather than abuse itself. These five points of contention suggest ample reasons to be skeptical of the claim that child abuse plays a central or direct causal role in DID—although, as we will suggest later, it may be one element of the complex etiological network that contributes to this condition. The Sociocognitive Model In contrast to the posttraumatic model, the sociocognitive model (Spanos, 1994; see also Aldridge-Morris, 1989; Lilienfeld et al., 1999; McHugh, 1993; Sarbin, 1995) proposes that DID is a consequence of social learning and expectancies. This model holds that DID results from inadvertent therapist cueing (e.g., suggestive questioning regarding the existence of possible alters, hypnosis for memory recovery, sodium amytal), media influences (e.g., television and film portrayals of DID), and sociocultural expectations regarding the presumed clinical features of DID. In aggregate, the sociocognitive model posits that these influences can lead predisposed individuals to become convinced that indwelling entities— alters—account for their dramatic mood swings, identity changes, impulsive actions, and other puzzling behaviors (see below). Over time, especially when abetted by suggestive therapeutic procedures, efforts to recover memories, and a propensity to fantasize, they may come to attribute distinctive memories and personality traits to one or more imaginary alters. A number of findings (e.g., Lilienfeld & Lynn, 2003; Lilienfeld et al., 1999; Piper, 1997; Spanos, 1994) are consistent with the sociocognitive model and present serious challenges to the posttraumatic model. For example, the number of patients with DID, along with the number of alters per DID patient, increased dramatically from the 1970s to the 1990s (Elzinga, van Dyck, & Spinhoven, 1998), although the number of alters at the time of initial diagnosis appears to have remained constant (North, Ryall, Ricci, & Wetzel, 1993). In addition, the massive increase in reported cases of DID followed closely upon the release in the mid-1970s of the bestselling book (turned into a widely viewed television film in 1976), Sybil (Schreiber, 1973), which told the story of a young woman with 16 personalities who reported a history of severe child abuse at the hands of her mother (see Nathan, 2011; Rieber, 2006, for evidence that many details of the Sybil story are inaccurate). Manifestations of DID symptoms also vary across cultures. For example, in India, the transition period as the individual shifts between alter personalities is typically preceded by sleep, a presentation that reflects common media portrayals of DID in that country (North et al., 1993). Moreover, mainstream treatment techniques for DID often reinforce patients’ displays of multiplicity (e.g., asking questions like, “Is there another part of you with whom I have not spoken?”), reify alters as distinct personalities (e.g., calling different alters by different names), and encourage patients to establish contact and dialogue with presumed alters. Interestingly, many or most DID patients show few or no clear-cut signs of this condition (e.g., alters) prior to psychotherapy (Kluft, 1984), raising the specter that alters are generated by treatment. Indeed, the number of alters per DID individual tends to increase substantially over the course of DID-oriented psychotherapy (Piper, 1997). Curiously, psychotherapists who use hypnosis tend to have more DID patients in their caseloads than do psychotherapists who do not use hypnosis (Powell & Gee, 1999), and most DID diagnoses derive from a small number of therapy specialists in DID (Mai, 1995), again suggesting that alters may be created rather than discovered in therapy. These sources of evidence do not imply that DID can typically be created in vacuo by iatrogenic (therapist-induced) or sociocultural influences. Sociocognitive theorists acknowledge that iatrogenic and sociocultural influences typically operate against a backdrop of preexisting psychopathology. Indeed, the sociocognitive model is consistent with findings that many or most patients with DID, and to a lesser extent other dissociative disorders, meet criteria for borderline personality disorder, a condition marked by extremely unstable behaviors, such as unpredictable shifts in mood, impulsive actions, and self-mutilation (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). Individuals with this disorder are understandably seeking an explanation for their bewildering behaviors. The presence of hidden alters may be one such explanation, and it may assume particular plausibility when suggested by psychotherapists or sensational media portrayals. Cognitive Mechanisms of Dissociation Much of the literature on cognitive mechanisms of dissociation is more consistent with the sociocognitive model than with the posttraumatic model. For example, researchers have found little evidence for inter-identity amnesia among patients with DID using objective measures of memory (e.g., eventrelated potentials or behavioral tasks; Allen & Movius, 2000; Huntjens et al., 2006). In such studies, investigators present certain forms of information to one alter and see whether it is accessible to another alter. In most cases, it is, demonstrating that alters are not psychologically distinct entities. Contradicting the claim that individuals with heightened dissociation are defending against the impact of threat-related information and therefore exhibit slower or impaired processing of such information, patients with DID and other “high dissociators” display better memory for to-be-forgotten sexual words in directed-forgetting tasks (Elzinga, de Beurs, Sergeant, van Dyck, & Phaf, 2000). This finding is strikingly discrepant with the presumed coping function of dissociation. Studies of cognitive inhibition in highly dissociative clinical and nonclinical samples typically find a breakdown in such inhibition, challenging the widespread idea that amnesia (i.e., extreme inhibition) is a core feature of dissociation (Giesbrecht et al., 2008, 2010). The extant evidence therefore questions the widespread assumption that dissociation is related to avoidant information processing and suggests that apparent gaps in memory in interidentity amnesia, or dissociative amnesia more generally, could reflect intentional failures to report information. Moreover, the literature indicates that dissociation is marked by a propensity toward false memories, possibly mediated by heightened levels of suggestibility, fantasy proneness, and cognitive failures (e.g., lapses in attention). Indeed, at least 10 studies from diverse laboratories have confirmed a link between dissociation and fantasy proneness. In addition, heightened levels of fantasy proneness are associated with the tendency to overreport autobiographical memories and the false recall of aversive memory material (Giesbrecht et al., 2010). Accordingly, the relation between dissociation and fantasy proneness may explain why individuals with high levels of dissociation are especially prone to develop false memories of emotional childhood events. This explanation dovetails with data revealing links between dissociative symptoms and hypnotizability (Frischholz, Lipman, Braun, & Sachs, 1992) and high scores on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (Merckelbach, Muris, Rassin, & Horselenberg, 2000). Similarly, dissociation increases the number of commission memory errors (e.g., confabulations/false positives, problems discriminating perception from imagery) but not omission memory errors, which are presumably associated with dissociative amnesia (Holmes et al., 2005). These findings, together with research demonstrating a link between dissociation and cognitive failures, point to an association between a heightened risk of confabulation and pseudomemories. They also raise questions regarding the accuracy of retrospective reports of traumatic experiences. Still, these findings do not exclude some role for trauma in dissociation. Suggestibility, cognitive failures, and fantasy proneness could contribute to an overestimation of a genuine, although perhaps modest, link between dissociation and trauma. Alternatively, early trauma might predispose individuals to develop high levels of fantasy proneness, absorption (the tendency to become immersed in sensory or imaginative experiences; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), or related traits. In turn, such traits may render individuals susceptible to the iatrogenic and cultural influences posited by the sociocognitive model, thereby increasing the likelihood of DID. Sleep, Memory, and Dissociation A recent theory connecting sleep, memory problems, and dissociation may provide a conceptual bridge between the posttraumatic model and the sociocognitive model. In a review of 23 studies, van der Kloet, Merckelbach, Giesbrecht, and Lynn (2011) concluded that data from clinical and nonclinical samples provide strong support for a link between dissociative experiences and a labile sleep–wake cycle. This link, they contend, is evident across a range of sleep-related phenomena, including waking dreams, nightmares, and hypnagogic (occurring while falling asleep) and hypnopompic (occurring while awakening) hallucinations. Supporting this hypothesis, studies of the association between dissociative experiences and sleep disturbances have generally yielded modest correlations (in the range of .30 to .55), implying that unusual sleep experiences and dissociation are moderately related constructs (see also Watson, 2001). Nevertheless, these studies typically relied on cross-sectional designs. To address this limitation, Giesbrecht, Smeets, Leppink, Jelicic, and Merckelbach (2007) deprived 25 healthy volunteers of one night of sleep and found that sleep loss engenders a substantial increase in dissociative symptoms. They also found that this increase could not be accounted for by mood changes or response bias. van der Kloet, Giesbrecht, Lynn, Merckelbach, and de Zutter (in press) later conducted a longitudinal investigation of sleep experiences and dissociative symptoms among 266 patients who were evaluated on arrival and at discharge 6 to 8 weeks later. Sleep hygiene was a core treatment component. Prior to treatment, 24% of participants met the clinical cut-off for dissociative disorders (i.e., Dissociative Experiences Scale > 30; Bernstein-Carlson & Putnam, 1993); at follow-up, this number dropped to 12%. Although sleep improvements were associated with a reduction in global psychopathology (e.g., anxiety, depression), this reduction did not account fully for the specific effect of treatment on dissociation. The fact that a sleep-hygiene intervention reduces dissociative symptoms independent of generalized psychopathology bears noteworthy clinical implications. It also suggests that researchers may wish to revisit the treatment of dissociative disorders. Surprisingly, this clinically important area has received minimal investigation: For example, Brand, Classen, McNary, and Zaveri (2009) reported that only eight nonpharmacological studies, none of which was a well-controlled randomized trial, have examined treatment outcomes for DID. van der Kloet et al.’s (in press) findings suggest an intriguing interpretation of the link between dissociative symptoms and deviant sleep phenomena (see also Watson, 2001). According to their working model, individuals with a labile sleep– wake cycle experience intrusions of sleep phenomena (e.g., dreamlike experiences) into waking consciousness, in turn fostering dissociative symptoms. This labile sleep–wake cycle may stem in part from a genetic propensity (Lang, Paris, Zweig-Frank, & Livesley, 1998), distressing trauma-related memories, or other unknown causal influences. van der Kloet et al.’s model further proposes that disruptions of the sleep– wake cycle degrade memory and attentional control, thereby accounting for, or at least contributing to, the cognitive deficits of highly dissociative individuals. Accordingly, the sleep-dissociation perspective may explain (a) how aversive events disrupt the sleep–wake cycle and increase vulnerability to dissociative symptoms, and (b) why dissociation, trauma, fantasy proneness, and cognitive failures overlap. Thus, this perspective is commensurate with the possibility that trauma engenders sleep disturbances that in turn play a pivotal role in the genesis of dissociation and suggests that competing theoretical perspectives may be amenable to integration. The SCM holds that patients become convinced that they possess multiple selves as a by-product of suggestive media, sociocultural, and psychotherapeutic influences. Their sensitivity to suggestive influences may arise from increased salience of distressing memories (some of which may stem in part from trauma) and susceptibility to memory errors and a propensity to fantasize and experience difficulties in distinguishing fantasy from reality, brought about at least in part by sleep disruptions. The data we have summarized have received only scant attention in the clinical literature. Nevertheless, they have the potential to reshape the conceptualization and operationalization of dissociative disorders in the upcoming edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSMV, publication scheduled in 2013). In particular, they suggest that sleep disturbances, as well as sociocultural and psychotherapeutic influences, merit greater attention in the conceptualization and perhaps classification of dissociative disorders (Lynn et al., in press). From this perspective, the hypothesis that dissociative disorders can be triggered by (a) a labile sleep cycle that impairs cognitive functioning, combined with (b) highly suggestive psychotherapeutic techniques, warrants empirical investigation. More broadly, the data reviewed point to fruitful directions for our thinking and research regarding dissociation and dissociative disorders in years to come.

Respond to whether you think DID (Dissociative Identity Disorder) “exists” and what you mean by that. In your opinion, do you think it exists? What do you think DID is and what causes it and why?

What types of extraneous variables should the researchers be concerned about in this study?

Purpose of the Study. The researchers examined preferences for beer under conditions that varied in terms of when information about an ingredient of one of the beers was given: before tasting, after tasting but before preferences were indicated, and never (no information was given to one group about the ingredients). The ingredient given is one that most people think should make the beer taste worse. The research question was whether the timing of the ingredient information would affect the preference for the beer by influencing one’s expectation of taste of the beer. Preference for the beer with the undesired ingredient should be lower in any condition where the information influences the preference.

Method of the Study. Pub patrons in Massachusetts were asked to participate in a taste test of two types of beer labeled “regular beer” and “MIT brew.” The “MIT brew” contained a few drops of balsamic vinegar (the vinegar apparently changed the flavor of the beer very little). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three groups that differed according to when information was given: blind group (no information given), before-tasting group (information given before tasting), and after-tasting group (information given after tasting but before preference was indicated). All participants were given a small sample of each beer to taste. They were asked to indicate which of the two beers they preferred.

Results of the Study. In the blind condition, the “MIT brew” was preferred more often (about 60% of the group) than the before condition (only about 30% of the group), indicating that ingredient information had an effect before tasting. However, the “MIT brew” was also preferred more often in the after condition (just over 50% of the group) than in the before condition and was not preferred less often than the blind condition, indicating that when ingredient information is given after tasting, it does not affect preference. Figure B.1 presents the means of the three groups.

Conclusions of the Study. The researchers concluded that the timing of information about a beer-drinking experience affects preference for the beer. Their results indicated that when information about the beer ingredient was given before the participants tasted the beer, it affected their tasting experience (and their preferences), but when information was given after the participants tasted the beer, it did not affect their experience or their preference. More generally, this study showed that our expectations of our perceptual experiences affect how we judge those experiences.

SOURCE: Results from Lee, Frederick, and Ariely’s (2006) study.

Discuss in depth Sternberg’s triangular theory of love. Give examples of each point of the triangle, including consummate love. Please elaborate in a minimum 3-5 paragraph

List and DESCRIBE three distinct categories of jazz and give an example for each.

one of the characteristics of intellectual development in adolescent is inquisitive about adults, challenging their authority and always observing them

a)Discuss this characteristics and give an example

Have you ever sent a text message that revealed your most intimate of thoughts and emotions?  Text messages are often raw, unvarnished, and immediate, not to mention can be taken completely out of context. However, we send them to those who are expected to guard them from publication.

The status of text messages in criminal investigations remains unsettled in the US. Is it reasonable for people to expect the contents of their electronic text messages to remain private, especially from law enforcement? Do we have a right to privacy for text message conversations? Even the United States Supreme Court has struggled with the legal challenges raised by emerging technology, most especially in the realm of cellular phones and their contents.

Situation 1

David Leon Riley was arrested on August 22, 2009, after a traffic stop resulted in the discovery of loaded firearms in his car. The officers took Riley's phone, and searched through his messages, contacts, videos, and photographs. Based in part on the data stored on Riley's phone, the officers charged him with an unrelated shooting that had taken place several weeks prior to his arrest.

Situation 2

Gregory Diaz, was arrested for the sale of the illicit drug ecstasy and his cell phone, containing incriminating evidence, was seized and searched without a warrant. In trial court proceedings, Diaz motioned to suppress the information obtained from his cell phone, which was denied   on the grounds that the search of his cell phone was incident to a lawful arrest.

Situation 3

At 6:08am, on October 4, 2009, Trisha Oliver frantically called 911 from her apartment in Cranston, Rhode Island when her six-year-old son, Marco Nieves, stopped breathing. The Fire Department took Marco to Hasbro Children's Hospital, where he was found to be in full cardiac arrest. He died 11 hours later.

By 6:20am, Sgt. Michael Kite of the Cranston Police Department had arrived at the apartment, where he found Oliver, her boyfriend Michael Patino, and their 14-month-old daughter, Jazlyn Oliver. Kite observed a couple of stripped beds  and linens on the floor, a trash can with vomit inside it, dark brown vomit in a toilet, and, crucially, a cell phone on the kitchen. Kite picked up the cell phone.

Kite viewed a text message on the phone, which was owned by Trisha Oliver, reading "Wat if I got 2 take him 2 da hospital wat do I say and dos marks on his neck omg." The message was sent from Oliver to Patino, although the sending of the message apparently failed. There were other messages on the phone "with profane language and references to punching Marco—three times—the hardest of which was in the stomach," according to court records. Patino was then arrested and charged with murder. He later confessed to the death of Marco Nieves.

Sgt. Kite claims he picked up the phone because it was "beeping," and that he thought it might help get in touch with the boy's birth father.

Patino's attorney argues to exclude the State‘s core evidence from being used at trial, which is the text messages. He wants any other evidence steaming from it such as all cell phones and their contents, all cell phone records, and critical portions of the Defendant‘s videotaped statement and his written statement given to the police suppressed as well. The attorney claims, the cell phone searches were "illegal as warrantless or in excess of the warrants obtained," and "As such, all of these searches and seizures, therefore, were unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment,"

I realized the information I presented is limited...What do you think about the cases in general? Do you think that Riley or Diaz had an expectation of privacy? Do you think that Patino and Oliver had an expectation of privacy, since the phone was on the kitchen counter in their apartment? Would it make a difference if the phone was found outside in the grass? Do you think the police violated their fourth amendment rights? Should the police have secured a search warrant before looking in the phone in any of these situations? How should the judge handle these cases? Keep in mind that these ruling are used for the basis of future decisions by the courts. Should digital contents of a cell phone be categorized as a warrantless search? Do you think these situations are different from each other or should they all be handled the same?

talked about the multifaceted roles, significance and issues associated with women in any of the Western (Abrahamic, i.e. Judaism, Christi-anity, or Islam) or Indigenous religions in North America.

please if you can provide the resource as a reference that will be awesome thank you

Charlie is a 14-year-old boy, 5 feet tall and weighing 100 lbs. He had a juvenile criminal history. He was arrested and put in an adult prison for shooting and killing Charlie, his mother’s boyfriend George, who also was a local police officer. George had a history of physically and psychologically abusing Charlie’s mother and enacting physical and psychological trauma on Charlie.

Explain how a social worker/therapist should engage with Charlie and assessed him for childhood trauma.

Describe a personal experience of classical conditioning. You must describe a real-life example of behavior that you have observed in others or experienced yourself. You would need to identify the UCS, CS, UCR, etc. Make sure you include enough information clearly understand how the concept applies to behavioral example (e.g., extinction, generalization etc.)

Washington Irving, “Rip Van Winkle”

1. How does Rip's "meekness of spirit" gain him popularity?

2. Why do the children follow Rip?

3. Discuss the description of the "amphitheater" before Rip falls asleep. Compare it to the description after he awakens. What is the significance?

4. Discuss the meaning of the changes at the village inn. In what ways does the behavior of the patrons change? What inspired the changes? What does this convey about human nature?

READING TEXT: Fleeing Facebook Carmen Joy King 1 In March, at the peak of Facebook popularity, I quit. With four swift clicks of the mouse, I canceled my account. Gone was the entire online persona I had created for myself – profile pictures, interests and activities, work history, friends acquired – all carefully thought out to showcase to the world the very best version of me, all now deleted. 2 Ironically, the decision to destroy my carefully built-up virtual image came as a result of wanting to enhance my profile. All that particular week I’d been hungry for new quotes on my page, something to reflect the week I’d been having: something introspective. I perused a quotes website and found this one attributed to Aristotle: “We are what we repeatedly do.” 3 I became despondent. What, then, was I? If my time was spent changing my profile picture on Facebook, thinking of a clever status update for Facebook, checking my profile again to see if anyone had commented on my page, Is this what I am? A person who re-visits her own thoughts and images for hours each day? And so what do I amount to? An egotist? A voyeur? Whatever the label, I was unhappy and feeling empty. The amount of time I spent on Facebook had pushed me into an existential crisis. It wasn’t the time-wasting, per se, that bothered me. It was the nature of the obsession – namely self-obsession. Enough was enough. I left Facebook. 4 In the past, my feelings toward Facebook and similar social networking sites had swung between a genuine sense of connection and community to the uncomfortable awareness that what all of our blogs, online journals and personal profiles really amounted to was serious narcissism. As my feelings of over-exposure continued to mount, the obvious solution would have been to set limits on my Facebook time – yet I still found myself sucked in for longer periods every time I visited. In part, it was the hundreds of little links to and hints about other people’s lives that kept me coming back. But even more addicting were the never-ending possibilities to introduce, enhance and reveal more of myself. 5 The baby-boomers were at one time thought to be the most self-absorbed generation in American history and carried the label of the Me Generation. In recent years this title has been appropriated, twisted and reassigned to the babies of those same boomers – born in the 80s and 90s – now called Generation Me or the Look at Me Generation. Author Jean Twenge, an Associate Professor of Psychology at San Diego State University and herself a member of Generation Me – spent ten years doing research on this group’s sense of entitlement and self-absorption. She attributed it to the radical individualism that was engendered by baby-boomer parents and educators focused on instilling self- esteem in children beginning in the 1970s. American and Canadian youth were raised on aphorisms such as “express yourself” and “just be yourself.” To further illustrate her point, Twenge also found a large increase in self-reference words like “I,” “me,” “mine” and “myself” in news stories published in the 80s and 90s. These words replaced collective words such as “we,” “us,” “humanity,” “country” or “crowd” found in the stories of a similar nature in the 50s and 60s. This generation might be the least thoughtful, community-oriented and conscientious one in North American history. 6 In the end, what does all this online, arms-length self-promotion ultimately provide? Perhaps it’s merely one component of the pursuit to alleviate some of the blackness encountered in the existential vacuum of modern life. As Schopenhauer once projected, modern humans may be doomed to eternally vacillate between distress and boredom. For the vast majority of people experiencing the fragmented, fast-paced modern world of 2008, a Sunday pause at the end of a hectic week may cause them to become all too aware of the lack of content in their lives. So we update our online profiles and tell ourselves that we are reaching out. 7 And yet, the time we waste on Facebook only makes our search for comfort and community more elusive. Online networking sites are marketed as facilitators of community-orientation but when I think about the millions of people – myself included – who spend large portions of their waking lives feeding off an exchange of thousands of computerized, fragmented images, it doesn’t add up to community-engagement. These images have no meaning beyond “I look pretty from this angle” or “I’m wasted” or “look who my new boyfriend is.” And as we continue to chase even harder – accessing Facebook at work, uploading images from our cell phones – we spend our money on constantly upgraded electronic gadgets marketed to our tendency to self-obsess and present particularly uninteresting and repetitive images of ourselves. There’s got to be more than this. 8 And so I quit… 9 After I left Facebook, I wondered what all my friends, family and acquaintances were going to think when they noticed I’d disappeared off the Facebook earth. So some of my Facebook narcissism – am I being noticed, am I being missed – remains. But I’m also asking myself some new questions. How do I find balance between my online life and my “real” life? How much exposure is healthy? How do I act responsibly for myself and engage with those I love? These are still “me” thoughts but they feel different than before. As I sit here, keyboard under palm, eyes on screen, I try to remind myself that my hands and eyes need to venture out into the community and look and touch the truly tangible that lies just beyond that other big screen: my window.

II. READING COMPREHENSION: Choose the best answer for each question by copying and pasting your chosen answer or typing the corresponding letter of the answer in the space after test questions for sections 2 & 3.

1. King deleted her Facebook profile __________ A) to focus more on her work B) to follow what her friends were doing C) to take her friend’s advice D) for none of the above reasons

2. King was upset with the way she had been using Facebook because __________ A) it was a waste of time B) it had made her too absorbed with herself C) it had affected her social life D) it had had a negative effect on her health

3. King quotes Aristotle in the article because __________ A) his quote motivated her B) she was unhappy with how she had been using social media C) she found his quote reflected her self-reflection D) his quote was popular on many social media

4. The endless opportunities that Facebook offer for self-introduction and self-exploration made King feel __________ A) addicted B) excited C) exhausted D) more stressful

5. Baby-boomers are mentioned in the article because __________ A) they were the first generation to use the “collective words” mentioned in this article B) they were regarded as the most community-oriented generation in history C) they started the trend of the online “self-promotion” D) they were considered as part of the reason for their children’s self-absorption

III. SHORT ESSAY WRITING: Choose TWO of the rhetorical/organizational modes and explain the effectiveness these two strategies have in conveying King’s main argument (in at least TWO extended paragraphs) in the space below. Paraphrase or quote details/examples to support your ideas and identify the paragraph numbers. Pay attention to language control and punctuation. Question 1 options:

online learning poses some challenges to students in developing countries like Ghana, with your own experience discuss four challenges you have faced since UENR's online learning program. Your answer should be at least 500 word long.

What do you think is causing the noted political polarization in America today (e.g., the voters, our political leaders, the media, money in politics, gerrymandering, etc.)? Do you think this gridlock and polarization are a threat to our republic? Why or why not?

Design a follow-up study to Aggression Priming. As you work on this discussion, try to think about what other variable might influence Aggression Priming. Give a hypothesis for what you expect to occur for your new independent variable.

Let me give you a few example, though try to get creative with your group. Look at prior research and see if you can use some of their work as a follow-up to your study. Have fun with it! Okay, consider some ideas I was thinking about for a follow-up study (Personally, I would recommend the second or third idea, as there is a lot of research you could draw on about these topics, which would make Paper III much easier to write).

First, you can alter the way that you manipulate aggression awareness. For example, some people can get the advertisements (aggression versus financial ads) while others get a game format (complete crossword puzzles / word searches that use either aggressive-related or finance-related words). Alternatively, you can give some participants aggression-related images (like guns and gore) while others get neutral images (like dollar signs or bills) while other participants get words (the actual words guns/gore for some versus words about money/dollars for others). Here, one IV would be type of topic (aggressive versus financial) while your other IV would be type of medium (images versus words).   

Second, source credibility is a good topic to explore. Have some participants read about Larry “the well-educated and respected doctor” while others read about Larry “the former prisoner who never graduated high school). Then, some participants get the financial ads while others get aggressive ads. Will the social status of Larry interact with the ads?.

A third idea might involve altering frustration. Give people a task and then tell some they did terrible and others they did wonderful. Does this feedback influence their assessments of Larry depending on whether they see aggressive versus financial ads?

Finally, you can look at some participant characteristics if you like. You can measure the participants’ likelihood to have a hostile attribution bias (the tendency to perceive others as acting aggressively, even when they aren’t). Or you can focus on whether or not the participant plays a lot of violent video games (versus few violent video games) to see if those who play such games are impacted more by the aggressive ads then those who do not play those games. You could see if participant gender interacts with the type of ad. Just remember that if you choose a participant characteristic, you cannot draw cause-effect conclusions (since you cannot randomly assign someone to be high versus low in hostile attribution bias or to be a man versus a woman). That is why I would prefer that you manipulate some feature of the study so you can randomly assign people to one of the four different conditions.