Assume that there are 10 risk-neutral bidders participating in an independent private value auction. The bidders...

Assume that there are 10 risk-neutral bidders participating in an independent private value auction. The bidders assume that item’s value is normally distributed between $10,000 and $30,000. Determine the optimal bidding strategy for each of the following options if you value the item at $20000.

3.1 First-price, sealed-bid auction

3.2 Dutch auction

3.3 Second-price, sealed-bid auction

3.4 English auction

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Expert Solution

Rahul Sunny answered 1 year ago

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