Question

In: Statistics and Probability

Auction Auction Price Age of Item Number Bidders 1 $946 113 9 2 $1,336 126 10...

Auction Auction Price Age of Item Number Bidders
1 $946 113 9
2 $1,336 126 10
3 $744 115 7
4 $1,979 182 11
5 $1,522 150 9
6 $1,235 127 13
7 $1,483 159 9
8 $1,152 117 13
9 $1,545 175 8
10 $1,262 168 7
11 $845 127 7
12 $1,055 108 14
13 $1,253 132 10
14 $1,297 137 9
15 $1,147 137 8
16 $1,080 115 12
17 $1,550 182 8
18 $1,047 156 6
19 $1,792 179 9
20 $729 108 6
21 $854 143 6
22 $1,593 187 8
23 $1,175 111 15
24 $1,713 137 15
25 $1,356 194 5
26 $1,822 156 12
27 $1,884 162 11
28 $1,024 117 11
29 $2,131 170 14
30 $785 111 7
31 $1,092 153 6
32 $2,041 184 10

36. Continuing Problem 18, suppose that the antique collector believes that the rate of increase of the auction price with the age of the item will be driven upward by a large number of bidders. How would you revise the multiple regression equation developed previously to model this feature of the problem? a. Estimate your revised equation using the data in the file P10_18.xlsx. b. Interpret each of the estimated coefficients in your revised model. c. Does this revised model fit the given data better than the original multiple regression model? Explain why or why not.

Solutions

Expert Solution

36. Continuing Problem 18, suppose that the antique collector believes that the rate of increase of the auction price with the age of the item will be driven upward by a large number of bidders. How would you revise the multiple regression equation developed previously to model this feature of the problem?

a. Estimate your revised equation using the data in the file P10_18.xlsx.

The estimated regression line is

Auction Price = -1,336.7221+12.7362* Age of Item +85.8151* Number Bidders

b. Interpret each of the estimated coefficients in your revised model.

When age of item increases by 1 unit, auction price increases by 12.7362.

When Number Bidders increases by 1 , auction price increases by 85.8151.

c. Does this revised model fit the given data better than the original multiple regression model? Explain why or why not.

R square =0.893.

89.3% of variance in auction price is explained by the model.

( compare this with your previous model and interpret)

Excel Addon Megastat used.

Menu used: correlation/Regression ---- Regression Analysis

Regression Analysis

0.893

Adjusted R²

0.885

n

32

R

0.945

k

2

Std. Error

133.137

Dep. Var.

Auction Price

ANOVA table

Source

SS

df

MS

F

p-value

Regression

4,277,159.7034

2  

2,138,579.8517

120.65

8.77E-15

Residual

514,034.5153

29  

17,725.3281

Total

4,791,194.2188

31  

Regression output

confidence interval

variables

coefficients

std. error

   t (df=29)

p-value

95% lower

95% upper

Intercept

-1,336.7221

173.3561

-7.711

1.67E-08

-1,691.2751

-982.1690

Age of Item

12.7362

0.9024

14.114

1.60E-14

10.8906

14.5818

Number Bidders

85.8151

8.7058

9.857

9.14E-11

68.0099

103.6204


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