You hold an auction among three bidders. You estimate that each bidder has a value of...

You hold an auction among three bidders. You estimate that each bidder has a value of either $16 or $20 for the item, and you attach probabilities to each value of 50%. What is the expected price? If two of the three bidders collude, what is the price?

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Rahul Sunny answered 1 year ago

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