In: Accounting
Banzhaf Power Index
Consider 5 voters, labeled A, B, C, D, and E, who are shareholders on a company board.
1) If there are 11 votes total and a 2/3 majority is required to pass a motion, what is the quota? That is, how many votes are required to pass a motion?
(Hint: the answer is a whole number between 0 and 11 that represents at least a 2/3 majority).
2) Suppose A has 5 votes, B has 3 votes, and C, D, and E have one vote each. Determine the Normalized BPI and the Absolute BPI for each voter.
3) If A gives one vote to B, so that the new distribution of votes is: A has 4, B has 4, C has 1, D has 1, and E has 1, what happens to voter A's Normalized BPI (meaning, voter A's share of power)--does it increase, decrease, or stay the same?
4) In a weighted voter scheme, a "dummy voter" is a voter who effectively has no power (NBPI = 0) even though they are allowed more than zero votes.
Give an example of a voting situation (quota and distribution of votes among voters) where at least one of the voters is a dummy voter.
5) Give your best explanation for the apparently paradoxical answer to #3 above.
Answer to 1.
Votes required to pass a motion
Total votes = 11 multiplied by 2/3rd
= 7.33
= 8 (Whole number)
Hence the quota is 8
Answer to 2.
A critical player is one whose vote makes the difference between winning or losing. Let T be the total number of critical players.
The Banzhaf power index of a player P is the number of times P is critical, divided by T.
| 
 Winning coalitions  | 
 Weight  | 
 Critical players  | 
| 
 A, B  | 
 8  | 
 A, B  | 
| 
 A,B,C  | 
 9  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,D  | 
 9  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,E  | 
 9  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,C,D,E  | 
 8  | 
 A,C,D,E  | 
| 
 A,B,C,D  | 
 10  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,D,E  | 
 10  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,C,E  | 
 10  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,C,D,E  | 
 11  | 
 A  | 
In the example, A is critical 8 times, B is critical 7 times, and C, D & E is only critical 1 time.
Normalised Banzhaf index: the number of swings as a proportion of the total number of swings for all members. The indices sum to 1 over all members.
| 
 T (Critical times)  | 
 Power  | 
|
| 
 A  | 
 9  | 
 47.37%  | 
| 
 B  | 
 7  | 
 36.84%  | 
| 
 C  | 
 1  | 
 5.26%  | 
| 
 D  | 
 1  | 
 5.26%  | 
| 
 E  | 
 1  | 
 5.26%  | 
| 
 19  | 
Absolute Banzhaf index: the number of swings divided by the number of possible voting outcomes among the other members.
| 
 T (Critical times)  | 
 Power  | 
|
| 
 A  | 
 9  | 
 100.00%  | 
| 
 B  | 
 7  | 
 77.78%  | 
| 
 C  | 
 1  | 
 11.11%  | 
| 
 D  | 
 1  | 
 11.11%  | 
| 
 E  | 
 1  | 
 11.11%  | 
| 
 19  | 
Answer to 3.
| 
 Winning coalitions  | 
 Weight  | 
 Critical players  | 
| 
 A, B  | 
 8  | 
 A, B  | 
| 
 A,B,C  | 
 9  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,D  | 
 9  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,E  | 
 9  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,C,D  | 
 10  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,D,E  | 
 10  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,C,E  | 
 10  | 
 A,B  | 
| 
 A,B,C,D,E  | 
 11  | 
| 
 T (Critical times)  | 
 Power  | 
|
| 
 A  | 
 7  | 
 50.00%  | 
| 
 B  | 
 7  | 
 50.00%  | 
| 
 C  | 
 0  | 
 0.00%  | 
| 
 D  | 
 0  | 
 0.00%  | 
| 
 E  | 
 0  | 
 0.00%  | 
| 
 14  | 
 1  | 
So the revise power of A reduces to 50% from 100%
Answer to 4.
In the answer 3 it can be observed that A & B are power voter’s whereas C, D & E are dummy voters. Dummy voters are those who do not have any weightage i.e. NBPI of 0%