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Refer to a duopoly market in which the inverse demand function is given by P =...

Refer to a duopoly market in which the inverse demand function is given by P = 96 − Q. Firm 1's cost function is c(q1) = 6q1 + 300, and firm 2's cost function is c(q2) = 6q2 + 600 (such that each firm has MC = 6).

Q1: The outputs of the two firms in Cournot-Nash equilibrium will be:

1) q1 = 45 and q2 = 0.

2) q1 = 30 and q2 = 30.

3) q1 = 45 and q2 = 22.5.

4) q1 = 28 and q2 = 28.

5) None of the other answers is correct.

Q2: The profits of the two firms in Cournot-Nash equilibrium will be:

1) π1 = 600 and π2 = 300.

2) None of the other answers is correct.

3) π1 = 300 and π2 = 600.

4) π1 = 900 and π2 = 900.

5) π1 = 2,025 and π2 = 0.

Q3: The outputs of the two firms in Stackelberg equilibrium, with firm 2 as the leader, will be:

1) q1 = 45 and q2 = 22.5.

2) q1 = 0 and q2 = 45.

3) q1 = 22.5 and q2 = 45.

4) q1 = 45 and q2 = 0.

5) None of the other answers is correct.

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