Question
In: Economics
Two firms compete as a Stackellberg duopoly. The inverse market demand function they face is P...
Two firms compete as a Stackellberg duopoly. The inverse market demand function they face is P = 65 – 3Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 11Q. The outputs of the two firms are
Solutions
Rahul Sunny answered 2 years agoRelated Solutions
Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The inverse market demand function they face is P...
Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The inverse market
demand function they face is P = 65 – 3Q. The cost function for
each firm is C(Q) = 11Q. The outputs of the two firms are
QL = 9, QF = 4.5
QL = 9, QF = 10.5
QL = 6, QF = 3
QL = 4, QF = 2
Please help/ explain. Thank you
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the inverse demand function is P =...
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the
inverse demand function is P = 10 -2Q (quantity is measured in
millions). Firm 1 has been in business for one year, while Firm 2
just recently entered the market. Each firm has a legal obligation
to pay one year’s rent of $0.5 million regardless of its production
decision. Firm 1’s marginal cost is $2, and Firm 2’s marginal cost
is $6. The current market price is $8 and was...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with
inverse demand function P = 600 − 3Q. Each firm produces at a
constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this
information to compare the output levels and profits in settings
characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive
behavior.
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the inverse demand function is P =...
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the
inverse demand function is P = 20 -5Q (quantity
is measured in millions). Firm 1 has been in business for one year,
while Firm 2 just recently entered the market. Each firm has a
legal obligation to pay one year’s rent of $1 million regardless of
its production decision. Firm 1’s marginal cost is $2, and Firm 2’s
marginal cost is $10. The current market price is $15 and was...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with
inverse demand function P = 400 – 2Q. Each firm produces
at a constant marginal cost of $50 and has no fixed costs -- both
firms have a cost function C(Q) = 50Q.
If the market is defined as a Bertrand Oligopoly, what is the
market price?
Refer to the information above.
What is the total amount of Q produced in this market?
How much does firm 1...
Question 4 Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The demand they face is P =...
Question 4 Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The
demand they face is P = 40 − Q. The cost function for each firm is
C(Q) = 4Q. What are the profits of the two firms? I believe the
answer is πL = $162; πF = $81. however I need clear steps to
understand how to understand the process.
Two firms operate in a Cournot duopoly and face an inverse demand curve given by P...
Two firms operate in a Cournot duopoly and face an inverse
demand curve given by P = 200 - 2Q, where Q=Q1+Q2 If each firm has
a cost function given by C(Q) = 20Q, how much output will each firm
produce at the Cournot equilibrium?
a. Firm 1 produces 45, Firm 2 produces 45.
b. Firm 1 produces 30, Firm 2 produces 30
c. Firm 1 produces 45, Firm 2 produces 22.5
d. None of the above.
Two firms compete in a market with inverse demand P(Q) = a − Q, where the...
Two firms compete in a market with inverse demand P(Q) = a − Q,
where the aggregate quantity is Q = q1 + q2. The profit of firm i ∈
{1, 2} is πi(q1, q2) = P(Q)qi − cqi , where c is the constant
marginal cost, with a > c > 0. The timing of the game is: (1)
firm 1 chooses its quantity q1 ≥ 0; (2) firm 2 observes q1 and then
chooses its quantity q2 ≥...
1. Two firms compete in Cournot competition. Inverse demand in the market is given by P...
1. Two firms compete in Cournot competition. Inverse demand in
the market is given by P = 1500 − 3 Q and each firm has constant
marginal cost c = 420.
a) Assuming there are no fixed costs, find the Cournot
equilibrium market price and quantities produced by each firm.
(20 points)
b) Now suppose that each firm faces a non-sunk fixed cost of
20,000 if they produce at all. Would the firms still want to
produce the amounts you...
Refer to a duopoly market in which the inverse demand function is given by P =...
Refer to a duopoly market in which the inverse demand
function is given by P = 96 − Q. Firm 1's cost function is
c(q1) = 6q1 + 300, and firm 2's cost function
is c(q2) = 6q2 + 600 (such that each firm has
MC = 6).
Q1: The outputs of the two firms in Cournot-Nash
equilibrium will be:
1) q1 = 45 and q2 = 0.
2) q1 = 30 and q2 = 30.
3) q1 = 45...
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