In: Economics
Questions 1 through 4 refer to a duopoly market in which the inverse demand function is given by P = 96 − Q. Firm 1's cost function is c(q1) = 6q1 (such that MC1 = 6). Firm 2's cost function is c(q2) = 12q2 (such that MC2 = 12).
Q1.In a Bertrand equilibrium of this market:
a.Firm 1 serves the entire market at a price of 6.
b.Each firm serves half the market at a price of 6
c.Each firm serves half the market at a price of 12.
d.Firm 1 serves the entire market at a price slightly below 12.
e.None of the other answers is correct.
Q2.The market price and quantity when firm 1 acts as a single-price monopolist will be:
a.P = 54 and Q = 42
b.None of the other answers is correct.
c.P = 51 and Q = 45
d.P = 57 and Q = 39
e.P = 48 and Q = 48
Q3.The Cournot best-response function for firm 2 will be:
a.q2 = 42 − 0.5q1
b.None of the other answers is correct.
c.q2 = 45 − 0.5q1
d.q1 = 84 − 2q2
e.q2 = 0
Q4.The outputs of the two firms in Cournot-Nash equilibrium will be:
a.q1 = 26 and q2 = 32.
b.q1 = 32 and q2 = 26.
c.q1 = 28 and q2 = 28.
d.q1 = 30 and q2 = 30.
e.None of the other answers is correct.