Question
In: Economics
Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The inverse market demand function they face is P...
Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The inverse market demand function they face is P = 65 – 3Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 11Q. The outputs of the two firms are
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QL = 9, QF = 4.5 |
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QL = 9, QF = 10.5 |
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QL = 6, QF = 3 |
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QL = 4, QF = 2 |
Please help/ explain. Thank you
Solutions
Rahul Sunny answered 2 years agoRelated Solutions
Two firms compete as a Stackellberg duopoly. The inverse market demand function they face is P...
Two firms compete as a Stackellberg duopoly. The inverse
market demand function they face is P = 65 – 3Q. The cost function
for each firm is C(Q) = 11Q. The outputs of the two firms
are
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Question 4 Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The
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understand how to understand the process.
Two firms are participating in a Stackelberg duopoly. The demand function in the market is given...
Two firms are participating in a Stackelberg duopoly. The demand
function in the market is given by Q = 2000 − 2P . Firm 1’s total
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by C2(q2) = 100q2. Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the
follower.
(1) Write down the inverse demand function and the maximization
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R2(q1).
(2) Compute...
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the inverse demand function is P =...
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the
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Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with
inverse demand function P = 600 − 3Q. Each firm produces at a
constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this
information to compare the output levels and profits in settings
characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive
behavior.
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the inverse demand function is P =...
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the
inverse demand function is P = 20 -5Q (quantity
is measured in millions). Firm 1 has been in business for one year,
while Firm 2 just recently entered the market. Each firm has a
legal obligation to pay one year’s rent of $1 million regardless of
its production decision. Firm 1’s marginal cost is $2, and Firm 2’s
marginal cost is $10. The current market price is $15 and was...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with
inverse demand function P = 400 – 2Q. Each firm produces
at a constant marginal cost of $50 and has no fixed costs -- both
firms have a cost function C(Q) = 50Q.
If the market is defined as a Bertrand Oligopoly, what is the
market price?
Refer to the information above.
What is the total amount of Q produced in this market?
How much does firm 1...
Two firms operate in a Cournot duopoly and face an inverse demand curve given by P...
Two firms operate in a Cournot duopoly and face an inverse
demand curve given by P = 200 - 2Q, where Q=Q1+Q2 If each firm has
a cost function given by C(Q) = 20Q, how much output will each firm
produce at the Cournot equilibrium?
a. Firm 1 produces 45, Firm 2 produces 45.
b. Firm 1 produces 30, Firm 2 produces 30
c. Firm 1 produces 45, Firm 2 produces 22.5
d. None of the above.
Two firms compete in a market with inverse demand P(Q) = a − Q, where the...
Two firms compete in a market with inverse demand P(Q) = a − Q,
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{1, 2} is πi(q1, q2) = P(Q)qi − cqi , where c is the constant
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chooses its quantity q2 ≥...
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b) Now suppose that each firm faces a non-sunk fixed cost of
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