The point Q (ql , q2) is the image of the point P(p1, P2) on the...

The point Q (ql , q2) is the image of the point P(p1, P2) on the line r . (ai + bj) + c = O. Show that a(q2 - P2) - b(qt - PI) = 0, a(p1 + ql) + b(P2 + q2) + 2c = O. Hence, express the coordinates of Q in terms of Pl, P2, a, b, c and find the coordinates of the image of the point (3,1) in the line r · (i + 2j) + 1 = O.

Expert Solution

Colby Messinger answered 1 year ago

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