In: Operations Management
Viet Catfish Case
Sixteen years after the end of the
Vietnam war, the United States and
Vietnam signed a free trade agreement.
In December 2001, Vietnam
agreed to lower import tariffs and
restrictions on U.S. investments in
that nation. In return, the U.S.
agreed to dismantle discriminatory
trade barriers on Vietnamese
exports.
The trade pact was an instant
success. Vietnamese exports to
the U.S. more than doubled in the
first year after the trade pact was
signed, led by exports of textiles,
seafood, shoes, furniture, and
commodities. U.S. investments
in Vietnam also surged.
Catfish farmers in the
Mississippi Delta weren’t happy
about this surge in Viet-U.S. trade.
In fact, they were downright angr y.
For well over a decade, catfish
farmers in Mississippi, Arkansas,
and Louisiana had been struggling
to preserve their profits. As
reported in Chapter 23 of The
Economy Today (Chapter 8 in
The Micro Economy Today) low
entry barriers kept persistent
pressure on prices and profits.
The early entrepreneurs in the
industry had to contend with a
stream of cotton farmers who
sought higher returns in catfish
farming. Despite an impressive
rise in market demand, prices
and profits stayed low as the
industry expanded.
Surging Imports
The Viet-U.S. pact intensified competitive
pressures on Delta catfish
farmers. In 1998, only 575,000
pounds of Vietnamese catfish were
imported into the United States,
mostly in the form of frozen fillets.
Viet imports surged to 20 million
pounds in 2001 and jumped again
to 34 million pounds last year.
That was more competition than
domestic catfish farmers could
bear. The price of frozen fillets fell
by 15 percent in 2001, to a low of
62 cents a pound. Prices kept
falling in 2002, hitting a low of 53
cents a pound at years end. With
average production costs of 65
cents a pound, U.S. catfish farmers
were incurring substantial economic
losses. Suddenly, cotton farming
started looking better again.
Comparative Advantage
Shifting domestic resources from
catfish farming back to cotton
farming is consistent with the
principle of comparative advantage.
Most farm-raised U.S. catfish
are grown in clay-lined ponds filled
with purified waters from underground
wells. The fish are fed
pellets containing soybeans and
corn and are subject to regular
USDA health inspections.
Vietnamese catfish, by contrast,
are grown in giant holding pens
suspended under the free-flowing
Mekong river and other waterways.
The Vietnamese production process is
much less expensive, giving Vietnam’s
catfish farmers an absolute advantage
over U.S. farmers. Given the relatively
high costs of cotton farming in
Vietnam, the Vietnamese also have
a decided comparative advantage in
catfish farming. Because of this, both
the U.S. and Vietnam could enjoy
more output if the U.S. specialized
in cotton farming and Vietnam
specialized in catfish farming. That
is exactly the kind of resource
reallocation the surging Vietnamese
catfish exports was causing.
Trade Resistance
The 13,000 workers in the U.S.
catfish industry don’t want to hear
about comparative advantage.
They simply want to keep their jobs.
And their employers want to regain
economic profits. They aren’t willing
to sacrifice their own well-being for
the sake of cheaper fish and so-called
gains from trade.
Economic theory may not be on
the side of the domestic catfish
industry, but U.S. politicians
certainly are. At the urging of Trent
Lott, the Senate majority leader
from Mississippi, the U.S. Congress
decided that of the 2,000 or so
varieties of catfish, only the North
American channel variety of catfish
could be labeled as “catfish.”
Vietnamese catfish had to be labeled
as “basa” or “tra,” as in
the Vietnamese language.
To further discourage consumption
of imports, the Catfish Farmers of
America, an industry lobbying group,
ran advertisements warning American
consumers that “basa” and “tra” “float
a round in Third World rivers nibbling on
who knows what.” Arkansas
C o n g ressman Marion Berry warned that
Viet fish might even be contaminated by
Agent orange-- a defoliant sprayed over
the Vietnamese countryside by U.S.
f o rces during the Vietnam war. None of
these nontariff barriers halted the influx
of Viet catfish however.
Dumping Charges
U.S. catfish farmers decided to mount
a more direct attack on Viet catfish. The
Catfish Farmers of America filed a complaint
with the U.S. Department of
C o m m e rce, charging Vietnam of “dumping”
catfish on U.S. markets. Dumping
occurs when foreign producers sell their
p roducts abroad for less than the costs
of producing them or less than prices
in their own market.
On its face, the complaint seemed to
have no merit. Export prices were no
lower than domestic prices in Vi e t n a m .
Plus, Vietnamese farmers were evidently
e a rning economic profits. Hence, neither
form of dumping seemed plausible.
The Department of Commerce found a
loophole to resolve this contradiction.
C o m m e rce officials decided that
Vietnam was still not a “market econom
y.” As a “nonmarket economy” its
prices could not be regarded as re l i a b l e
indices of underlying costs. Instead, the
U.S. Department of Commerce would
have to independently assess the “true ”
costs of Vietnamese catfish production.
To determine the “true” costs of
Vietnamese catfish farming, U.S.
investigators went to Bangladesh!
Bangladesh is widely regarded as a
market economy, with a level of
development similar to Vi e t n a m ’s.
So Bangladesh prices were assigned
to Vietnamese farmers. With no fully
integrated firms and fewer natural
resource advantages, Bangladesh
ended up with hypothetical costs in
excess of Vietnamese prices. With this
“evidence” in hand, the Commerce
Department concluded in January 2003
that Vietnamese catfish were indeed
being dumped on U.S. markets.
Anti-Dumping Duties
To “level the playing field,” the
U.S. Commerce Department leveled
temporary import duties (tariffs) of
37-64 percent. Importers of Viet
catfish had to deposit these duties
into an escrow account until the
U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC) reviewed the case. The ITC
must not only affirm the practice of
dumping, but must also determine
that U.S. catfish farmers have been
materially damaged by such unfair
foreign competition. If the ITC so
rules, then the duties become
permanent and payable. If the ITC
rejects the dumping or damage
charges, the duties are rescinded
and the escrowed payments are
refunded. The odds are never
good for foreign producers: The
Commerce department ruled in
favor of domestic producers 91
percent of the time and the ITC
concurred 80 percent of the time.
The catfish case was similarly
decided: on July 23 of this year
the ITC unanimously ruled that
Viet catfish had injured U.S.
catfish farmers. The temporary
duties of 37-64 percent were
made permanent and retroactive
to January.
With your knowledge of comparative advantage and international trade – explain who were the winners and losers and why in this Catfish Case? Use economic terms and concepts to expain and support your answer. (5 points)
A free trade agreement signed by the United States and Vietnam, sixteen years after the Vietnam War saw a dramatic trade between the two countries. Vietnam decided to lower import tariffs and restrictions on U.S. investments in that nation, and the U.S. also agreed to revoke discriminatory trade barriers on Vietnamese exports. The trade agreement was an instant success as Vietnamese exports more than doubled and the U.S. investments in Vietnam also surged. The competitive pressures intensified on Delta catfish farmers on account of the Viet-U.S. pact. Imports of Vietnamese catfish into the U.S. was so severe that the U.S. catfish farmers were incurring substantial losses. Vietnamese farmers started exploiting comparative advantage of catfish farming instead of pursuing cotton farming, which has a relatively high cost.
Vietnamese production process of catfish is much less expensive and the comparative disadvantage of U.S. catfish farming was causing problems for the U.S. farmers. On account of this, U.S. farmers decided to raise a complaint charging Vietnam of dumping catfish on U.S. markets. Though the complaint seemed to have no merit, yet the Department of Commerce found a loophole to resolve this contradiction. The U.S. investigators went to Bangladesh to assess to determine the true costs of catfish as it was considered a market economy, though Vietnam was not. The Commerce Department conclude that Vietnamese catfish were indeed being dumped on U.S. markets and appropriate temporary duties were levelled on importers. The ITC unanimously concluded that the Vietnamese catfish had severely injured the U.S. catfish farmers and the import tariffs were made permanent and retroactive to January. The ruling was in favor of U.S. catfish farmers.
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