In: Economics
Theoretical Problem
A government employee can exert effort e ? [0,1] to produce a good. Effort has a cost ce2/2 and is unobservable. The probability that the good is produced is e and each citizen gets ?(?) utility for an arbitrary, given ? if the good is produced but 0 otherwise. One citizen is a monitor who can a cost ?m2/2 to observe whether the good was produced or not, and the monitor can successfully determine whether or not the good was produced with the probability ?. If he is successful, he pays a cost s to share the information with everyone else. If the government employee does not produce the good and the monitor informs everyone else, the government employee gets punished and has to pay ?. The timing of this game goes as follows:
Which type of good is a common-pool resource (a fishing area is an example of a common-pool resource)?
Which type of good is a private good?
Now suppose that p is a function of n and u(n)=10 and p(n)=n. This set-up provides information to suggest that the good is mostly likely:
Option d.
If the good is produced, then the citizen gets an arbitrary utility u(n) = n. Further the government employee exerts an effort with the Probability e. If the utility of the good to the individual decreases then, effort exerted by govt. employee will decrease. Therefore The equilibrium decreases because the equilibrium e is decreasing in u.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option c.
A common-pool resource such as a fishing area is a rival and non excludable good. It is rival because if individuals utilizes more resources for themselves it reduces the amount of resources available for others as it depletes resource base. Further it is non excludable because every person has right to use the resource by virtue and nobody can be excluded from consuming it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option a.
A private good is a rival and excludable good as simultaneous consumption of good by two or more independent households is not possible. Further since private good is obtained by making payment ,therefore it excludes households which cannot afford it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
option b.
If p is a function of n, it means that the government employee will be punished by n amount if it does not produce the good and is caught by the monitor.Also utility from the good is constant at 10, Therefore it is a non rival good.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option c.
If the cost of monitoring increases, then the citizen who is a monitor will be more successful in catching the govt. employee. Therefore in order to prevent being caught and paying a fine of n, the govt. employee will exert effort. So both m and e will increase.