Question

In: Economics

Assume two firms 1 and 2. The inverse market demand function is given by:              P=30-(q1+q2)...

Assume two firms 1 and 2. The inverse market demand function is given by:             

P=30-(q1+q2)

Each firm produces with marginal costs of

MC = 6

Fixed costs are zero.

The next questions refer to the Cournot duopoly.

Question 1 (1 point)

What is Firm 1's total revenue function?

Question 1 options:

TR1=30q1 -q1 -q22

TR1=30-2q1-q2

TR1=30q1 -q12-q2

None of the above.

Question 2 (1 point)

What is Firm 1's marginal revenue function?

Question 2 options:

MR1=30-2q1 -q2

MR1=30-q1-2q2

MR1=30-2q1-2q2

None of the above.

Question 3 (1 point)

What is Firm 1's response function?

Question 3 options:

q1=12-0.5q2

q1=12-q2

q1=12-2q2

None of the above

Question 4 (1 point)

If Firm 1 thinks that Firm 2 chooses to supply q2=10, then Firm 1's profit maximizing quantity would be q1*=

Question 4 options:

6

7

8

10

Question 5 (1 point)

If Firm 2 thinks that Firm 1 chooses to supply q1=7, then Firm 1's profit maximizing quantity would be q1*=

Question 5 options:

6.5

7.5

8.5

9.5

Question 6 (1 point)

In equilibrium, each firm will supply qi=

Question 6 options:

5

6

7

8

Question 7 (1 point)

The market price in equilibrium will be P*(q1+q2)=

Question 7 options:

14

16

18

20

Question 8 (1 point)

In equilibrium, each firm's total revenue is equal to TRi=

Question 8 options:

106

108

110

112

Question 9 (1 point)

In equilibrium, each firm's total variable cost is TVCi=

Question 9 options:

8

16

32

48

Question 10 (1 point)

In equilibrium, each firm's total profit is i=

Question 10 options:

32

40

48

64

Question 11 (1 point)

In equilibrium, total consumer surplus is CS=

Question 11 options:

128

169

196

225


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