Consider an industry with 2 firms whose total demand function is P(q1 +q2)=2 ,000−2(q1 +q2). The...

Consider an industry with 2 firms whose total demand function is P(q1 +q2)=2 ,000−2(q1 +q2).
The marginal costs are fixed and equal to $400 for each firm; the fixed costs are zero.
a. Find the Cournot equilibrium price and quantities.
b. Find the Bertrand equilibrium price and quantities.
c. Find the Stackelberg equilibrium price and quantities.

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Rahul Sunny answered 2 years ago

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