In the collusion game, we found that collusion was only sustainable in the infinite horizon repeated...

In the collusion game, we found that collusion was only sustainable in the infinite horizon repeated game. One Nash Equilbrium of that game can be found when all players play a “grim trigger” strategy, where they collude until an opponent chooses to compete, and then compete for all future rounds as a punishment. In such a game, if the one period bonus that comes from competing is low enough, firms always collude and the punishment is never triggered.

However, let’s think a little deeper about this Nash Equilibrium. Is the punishment (vowing to compete forever after one deviates) realistic, especially if firms can communicate freely? Why or why not? (Hint: Is a grim trigger Nash Equilibrium a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium? What kinds of Nash Equilibria does Subgame Perfection rule out in sequential games?)

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Rahul Sunny answered 1 year ago

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