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In: Economics

Consider 2 firms facing the demand curve: P=90-5Q, where Q =Q1+Q2 The firms' cost functions are...

Consider 2 firms facing the demand curve: P=90-5Q, where Q =Q1+Q2

The firms' cost functions are C1(Q1)=15+Q1 and C2(Q2)=15+30Q2

How much should Firm 1 be willing to pay Firm 2 if collusion is illegal but a takeover is not? Firm 1 should be willing to pay __.

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