Question

In Harmon v. Delaware Harness Racing Commission, the plaintiff (Harmon) sued the Commission to be reinstated in his job as Presiding Judge of harness racing. Explain why Harmon was suspended from his job, what promise was made to him and why the Commission refused to give him his job back. Further, the court noted that the Commission did not have a contract with Harmon to reinstate him, what legal theory did the court reference in finding in his favor and what are it's legal requirements?

Answer 1

In December 1998, the Commission hired Donald J. Harmon to serve as Presiding Judge. His job was to oversee both the racing and other racing officials.

Harmon was suspended because Harmon was charged with one misdemeanor and one felony based on Harmon's alteration of the judging sheet. When the Commission learned about Harmon's arrest, it suspended him without pay pending the outcome of the criminal case. He allegedly changed the judging sheet for a qualifying race as a favor to the horse's owner.

The commission had promised by Wayne, the Administrator of Racing during the relevant time period that Harmon would be reinstated as a Presiding Judge even if he is acquitted of charges. Harmon was acquitted of the criminal charges, and promptly asked Wayne to discuss with the Commission getting his job back. The Commission agreed to meet with Harmon and his attorney to consider Harmon's reinstatement. Ultimately, the Commission decided not to reinstate Harmon, and advised him by letter dated November 18, 2004

The court found that:-

The first issue is whether the Commission, as a state agency, can be held liable on a promissory estoppel claim. To prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a plaintiff must establish that:

(i) a promise was made; (ii) it was the reasonable expectation of the promisor to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (iii) the promisee reasonably relied on the promise and took action to his detriment; and (iv) such promise is binding because injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

The trial court found that there was no promise because Wayne had no actual authority to transmit the Commission's decision to Harmon.

The second element of the claim is that the Commission reasonably expected Harmon to rely on Wayne's representations. If Wayne's testimony is credited, there is no real dispute about this point. The third element is that Harmon reasonably relied on the Commission's promise and took action to his detriment. Harmon testified that, but for the Commission's promise to reinstate him, he would have looked for other work in Delaware or another state. He was offered several horse training opportunities, but he could not pursue them because, if he did, he would not be allowed to return to his position as a judge for one year. Harmon also considered applying to be a judge in another jurisdiction, but decided that he could not start elsewhere and walk away from a new position as soon as he was reinstated in Delaware. This testimony, if credited by the jury, satisfies Harmon's burden of showing reliance to his detriment.

Reliance damages are intended to “assure that those who are reasonably induced to take injurious action in reliance upon the non-contractual promises receive recompense for that harm. Harmon testified that he did not look for or accept other positions during his suspension because he expected to be reinstated, and other positions would interfere with his ability to return to the position of Presiding Judge. Harmon's expert opined that he would have earned net compensation of $175,400 for the period from January 2004 until November 2005.

Harmon's expert said he lost about $270,000 based on two years of lost earnings and interest. The jury award of $102,273 was given to him.