In: Economics
Isolationism and Interventionism
George Washington’s presidency, sought the beginning of a policy of isolationism and neutrality with regards to the internal affairs of other nations. Early American political leaders argued that with the exception of free trade, self-defense and humanitarian emergencies, the U.S. would do best to avoid permanent alliances that do not serve American interests but instead deflect attention from domestic issues. Americans reeled from the emotional and financial costs of war and began to feel as though joining the war effort was a mistake. When World War I broke out in July 1914, the United States actively maintained a stance of neutrality, and President Woodrow Wilson encouraged the U.S. as a whole to avoid becoming emotionally or ideologically involved in the conflict. Americans were more than happy to stay out of the war, and Wilson won a second Presidential term in 1916 by running on a platform of non-interference.
In 1918, Wilson articulated fourteen points to help end the war and establish a basis for cooperation, which included freedom of the seas, open economic trade, the evacuation of occupied territories, the liberation of non-Turkish peoples in the Ottoman Empire, and a general collection of nation states to offer members territorial integrity and political independence—setting the stage for what would later become the League of Nations.
But after several years observing acts of aggression by the Germans, Wilson began to change his viewpoint as he saw that the devastating war in Europe was threatening to spill across the Atlantic Ocean. With massive loss of life came a moral imperative that could no longer be ignored, requiring the United States to take a leadership role in maintaining and promoting freedom, sovereignty and self-determination for all nations. Wilson began making public statements that framed the war as a means to right the wrongs in the world rather than simple military posturing. Thus, the United States’ intervention in the First World War or, the “Great War,” helped shape the nation’s status as a self-proclaimed defender of freedom and democracy worldwide and radically altered U.S. foreign policy.
What ensued was a radical shift in U.S. foreign policy, which promoted a stance of isolationism that would last until World War II. U.S. foreign policy during the 1920s was characterized by the enactment of isolationist policies; for instance, the U.S. opted not to join the burgeoning League of Nations, even though it had been the nation to first propose such international cooperation. Instead, the United States focused on building the domestic economy by supporting business growth, encouraging industrial expansion, imposing tariffs on imported products and limiting immigration.
In the early 1940s, US policies such as the Cash and Carry Program and the Lend-Lease Act provided assistance to the Allied Powers in their fight against Germany. This growing involvement by the US marked a move away from isolationist tendencies towards interventionism.
Donald trump approach in foreign policy
The stated aims of the foreign policy of the Donald Trump administration include a focus on security, by fighting terrorists abroad and strengthening border defences and immigration controls; an expansion of the U.S. military; an "America First" approach to trade; and diplomacy whereby “old enemies become friends.”
Trump supported a robust national defence during the 2016 election campaign and in his first budget proposal as president in March 2017, proposed a $54 billion (10%) increase in defence spending, to a total of $639 billion for fiscal year 2018. He said the increase would be needed to fight terrorism, improve troop readiness, and build new ships and planes, and would be paid for by deep cuts to other agencies, including a 28% cut from the US State Department budget. He also requested an additional $30 billion for the US Defence Department for the remainder of fiscal year 2017. He emphasized that other countries need to increase their financial commitment to their own defence or compensate the United States for providing it. Upon taking office, Trump relied more on military personnel than previous administrations, and more on White House advisors rather than the State Department to advise him on international relations.
Among foreign policy decisions made during his presidency have been his reversals and re-evaluations of the U.S.'s previously-established global commitments, such as his partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from northern Syria, and withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the INF Treaty, and UNESCO. Trump introduced a travel ban from certain Muslim-majority countries, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, increased belligerency against Venezuela, and met thrice with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. He withdrew from the JCPOA nuclear deal and increased sanctions against Iran which triggered the 2019–2020 Persian Gulf crisis. The Trump administration often used economic pressure to advance its foreign policy goals. The Trump tariffs triggered a trade war with China. He signed the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), a replacement agreement for NAFTA, and brokered the Kosovo–Serbia agreement and the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain.
US' deal with Iran
When Iran, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, the European Union and Russia signed the JCPOA in 2015, none of the parties were under any illusions about what the deal would accomplish. Most critically, it was designed to buy time. The deal was designed like other nuclear agreements before it.
The aim was to effectively manage Iran’s nuclear threat, and that was achievement enough. The other dangers Tehran presented — its missile program (the means to deliver conventional and nuclear weapons), support for terrorist groups waging war with Israel and destabilizing the region, full-fledged assistance to the brutal regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and consistent meddling in the internal affairs of the Iraqi government — would be dealt with separately. And the agreement itself was temporary; implicit in the deal’s 15-year term was the suggestion of future renegotiation.
In exchange for relief from sanctions imposed by the United States and our European allies, the Iranian government agreed to cut its stockpile of uranium suitable for weapons production, lower uranium enrichment levels, restrict enrichment to one facility rather than two, and grant the International Atomic Energy Agency regular access to its nuclear facilities to monitor and verify compliance with the agreement.
It extended Iran’s “breakout” time — how long it would take to build a nuclear weapon — from a few months to a year or more. And it left room for the possibility that domestic and international events, including continued diplomacy, could slowly effect change in the Iranian government’s nuclear, domestic and foreign policies so that they would no longer run counter to U.S. interests.
To avoid wider confrontation, the Trump administration must choose its response carefully, but so far it’s been unrealistic.
The best option, then is Iran nuclear deal. We either rejoin the old one — unlikely, given Trump’s penchant for rejecting all things Obama — or sign a new one that looks a lot like the old one. If Trump could be persuaded to adopt this policy, a deal wouldn’t be hard to imagine: a time frame that extends well beyond 15 years; stricter missile development and production bans; an insistence that Iran release American, allied and partner-nation prisoners (including freelance journalist Austin Tice, held in Iran-influenced Syria); and a measurable commitment to an international peace process to end Syria’s civil war.
Trump may prefer an alternative, but there aren’t many. One is to ease the pressure without reducing the threat to the international order, as we’ve seen in the administration’s approach to North Korea. But that’s tantamount to a green light for Iran to build a nuclear weapon capability within months. Another option is to respond to Iranian escalation with escalation of our own, which only hardcore regime-change proponents might favor and for which Europe, Russia and China are already blaming us. Washington “created this mess, and now they have to find a way to get out,” said one German official. The easiest way to clean it up is to rush our diplomats to the scene with copies of the JCPOA and then have Trump, in a familiar hail of tweets, tout the promise of a “beautiful” (if not comprehensive) “new” (all of his own making, of course) Iran deal.