Question

In: Economics

Cournot Oligopoly and Number of Firms In a Cournot oligopoly, each firm assumes that its rivals...

Cournot Oligopoly and Number of Firms In a Cournot oligopoly, each firm assumes that its rivals do not change their output based on the output that it produces. Illustration: A Cournot oligopoly has two firms, Y and Z. Y observes the market demand curve and the number of units that Z produces. It assumes that Z does not change its output regardless of the number of units that it (Y) produces, so chooses a production level that maximizes its profits. The general effects of a Cournot oligopoly do not depend on the size of the firms, the shape of the market demand curve, or the shape of the marginal cost curve. The mathematics is easiest for firms of the same size, linear demand curves, and flat marginal cost curves. Suppose an industry has two firms, a linear demand curve, and marginal costs, and no fixed costs: Demand curve: Q = " – $ P Marginal cost curve: MC = k In a competitive industry, what is the equilibrium quantity for the industry? (Setting price equal to marginal cost gives Q = " – $ × k. Since the industry is competitive, price equals marginal cost, and the supply curve for the industry is P = k; this gives the same result.) What is the equilibrium quantity for the firm? (With two identical firms, each produces half the industry quantity.) If the two firms merge into a monopoly, what is the monopoly price? (Show that the marginal revenue curve is MR = " – 2 $ P, by setting total revenue = P × Q and differentiating with respect to Q. Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost gives k = " – 2 $ P A P = (" – k) / 2$ Q = " – $ P = " – ½ (" – k) = ½ " + ½ k A total of 2,400 units are produced. If there were three firms in this Cournot oligopoly, how many units would be produced? 1,800 units 2,400 units 2,700 units 3,000 units 3,600 units (In a two Cournot oligopoly, each firm produces a the competitive quantity; in a three firm Cournot oligopoly, each firm produces ¼ the competitive quantity.)

Solutions

Expert Solution

ANSWER:

Case 1: Competitive Industry

In the scenario, where industry is competitive, firms are assumed to be price takers i.e. price is given as an exogenous quantity.

Total profit in industry = Total revenue - Total cost

   

(Since P is exogenous and there are no fixed costs) and Q is the industry output.

Profit maximization is given by -

Since MC = k, substituting this in demand curve, we get:

This is the equilibrium quantity in the industry,

Since, both firms have equal size (same marginal cost), thus they have equal share in the market.

Hence, equilibrium quantity of the firm = Q/2

=

Case 2: Monopolistic Industry

In the scenario,

Total profit in industry = Total revenue - Total cost

   

and Q is the industry output = firm output (monopoly)

Since

Thus

Profit maximization is given by -

where

This is the equilibrium quantity in the industry,

Equilibrium price P is given by demand curve -

(Notice: Wrong answer given in the hints, MR is not given by derivative of TR w.r.t P but w.r.t Q)

Case 2: Cournot Tripoly

Quantity produced in competition =

In Cournot model of 3 firms with equal marginal cost c,

q =

Total output produced = 2400 (assumed to be arising from competition)

If it is a cournot tripoly, quantity produced by each firm = 2400 / 4 = 600

Thus total output produced by three firms = 600*3 = 1800

(Since each firm has same marginal costs, they hold equal share and produce equal quantity).


Related Solutions

in Cournot Oligopoly, Each firm believes rivals will hold their output constant if it changes its...
in Cournot Oligopoly, Each firm believes rivals will hold their output constant if it changes its output. <- what does it mean by this ? can anyone explain in detail?
N firms compete in a Cournot oligopoly. Each firm can produce at a constant average and...
N firms compete in a Cournot oligopoly. Each firm can produce at a constant average and marginal cost of AT C = MC = $5. Firms face a market demand demand curve given by Q = 53 − P. Where Q is the market quantity demanded with Q = Q1 + Q2 + .........QN 1. Find each firm’s reaction function taking into account that the firms are identical. 2. Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. What are the resulting market price and...
Three firms produce ethanol and compete in a Cournot oligopoly. Each firm has the same cost...
Three firms produce ethanol and compete in a Cournot oligopoly. Each firm has the same cost function, ??(?) = 1/ 2 ?. Market demand is given by ? = 600 − ?. The quantities produced by the three firms are respectively ?1,?2,?3. (a) What is firm 1’s optimal quantity as a function of ?2 and ?3? (b) What is the total quantity produced by all three firms?
11.Which of the following is true? (a) In Bertrand oligopoly each firm believes that their rivals...
11.Which of the following is true? (a) In Bertrand oligopoly each firm believes that their rivals will hold their output constant if it changes its output. (a) In Cournot oligopoly firms produce an identical product at a constant marginal cost and engage in price competition. (b) In oligopoly a change in marginal cost never has an effect on output or price. (c) (a) and (b) are true (d) None of the statements associated with this question are true. 12. In...
A Cournot oligopoly consists of four firms, each with a marginal cost of production of MC=10....
A Cournot oligopoly consists of four firms, each with a marginal cost of production of MC=10. The market demand curve is given by Q=(100-P)/3 . The four firms are looking to merge into a single firm so they can increase their profit margin by taking advantage of scale economies. Suppose that after the merger, market demand remains the same but the marginal cost of production of the merged firm decreases to MC=4. 26. What is the change in net social...
2) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse demand function p...
2) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse demand function p = 500 – 2Q. Their cost function is c (qi) = 20 + 4qi2 for i = a, b. Calculate the profit maximizing price output combination. (3)
3) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse demand function p...
3) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse demand function p = 25 – Q. Their cost function is c (qi) = 0.5*qi for i = a, b.  Calculate the profit maximizing price output combination. (3)
Assume that two firms are in a Cournot oligopoly market. Market demand is P=120 - Q...
Assume that two firms are in a Cournot oligopoly market. Market demand is P=120 - Q where Q isthe aggregate output in the market and P is the price. Firm 1 has the cost function TC(Q1)=30 + 10Q1 and Firm 2 has the cost function TC(Q2)=15 + 20Q2. a) Write down the Profit function of Firm 1: Profit function of Firm 2: b) Using the profit functions in part (a), obtain the reaction function of Firm 1 to Firm 2....
It has been said that no firm is totally sheltered from its rivals. All firms compete...
It has been said that no firm is totally sheltered from its rivals. All firms compete for consumer dollars. If this is the case, then it can be said that pure monopoly really does not exist. Do you agree? Explain. How might you use the concept of “cross elasticity of demand”, to judge whether monopolies exist?
As the number of firms in an oligopoly increases, and provided the firms do not successfully...
As the number of firms in an oligopoly increases, and provided the firms do not successfully collude, the price approaches marginal cost, and the quantity approaches the efficient level. price and quantity approach the monopoly levels. price effect exceeds the output effect. individual firms’ profits increase. As the number of firms in an oligopolized market decreases, and provided the firms do not successfully collude, the price charged by the firms and the total quantity produced will both decrease. decreases, and...
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT