Three firms produce ethanol and compete in a Cournot oligopoly. Each firm has the same cost...

Three firms produce ethanol and compete in a Cournot oligopoly. Each firm has the same cost function, ??(?) = 1/ 2 ?. Market demand is given by ? = 600 − ?. The quantities produced by the three firms are respectively ?₁,?₂,?₃.

(a) What is firm 1’s optimal quantity as a function of ?₂ and ?₃?

(b) What is the total quantity produced by all three firms?

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Expert Solution

ist part answer

2nd part answer is below

Rahul Sunny answered 2 months ago

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