2) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse demand function p...

2) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse demand function p = 500 – 2Q. Their cost function is c (q_i) = 20 + 4q_i² for i = a, b. Calculate the profit maximizing price output combination. (3)

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Rahul Sunny answered 1 month ago

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