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2) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse demand function p...

2) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse demand function p = 500 – 2Q. Their cost function is c (qi) = 20 + 4qi2 for i = a, b. Calculate the profit maximizing price output combination. (3)

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