Cooperative
pricing
Prices persist above Cournot, or, Bertrand levels. Cooperative
pricing is without formal collusion among firms. Formal collusion
is illegal. The equilibrium is the same as if there was explicit
collusion. It holds the prices above competitive levels. If the
number of sellers is small, as per Chamberlin, each seller
recognizes that the profit is short lived. Rivals matching price
cuts also makes cooperative pricing possible.
Cooperative pricing depends on the price sensitivity of
buyers.
Price
sensitivity of buyers, and, sustainability of cooperative
pricing
- Sustainability depends on the price sensitivity of buyers.
- If firms undercut the price of a product even by a small
amount, it achieves a significant cut in price volume
- A firm is tempted to cut the price; a temporary price cut
results in an increase in market share
- Price sensitivity comes from the extent to which a product is
horizontally differentiated
- At equal prices, if consumers prefer different products, then
the products are horizontally differentiated
- In case of a strong horizontal differentiation, price
competition is rather soft. For a slight increase in price,
consumers will purchase the same product
- Large price cuts are required to increase market share
- Price competition is fierce if the buyers are firms; buyers are
firms rather than households. These firms give weight to price
differences
- Some consumers highly price sensitive, some are less price
sensitive.
- For instance, Ketchup market has segments that are price
sensitive, and, a segment of loyal customers
- In case of segmentation due to buyer sensitivity, cooperative
pricing is sustainable. It depends on the relative size of
less-price sensitive, and, sensitive of consumers