Question

In: Economics

Consider the Cournot competition example in the lecture notes. Inverse demand function is P(Q) = 31...

Consider the Cournot competition example in the lecture notes. Inverse demand function is P(Q) = 31 ? 2Q. However, make the change that firm B’s cost function is CB(Q) = 2Q. Firm A’s cost function remains the same at CA(Q) = Q.
a) Determine firm A’s best response function Q*A (QB).
b) Determine firm B’s best response function Q*B (QA).
c) How much quantity is each firm producing in the Cournot
d) What is the price at which output goods are sold in the Cournot Nash equilibrium? Carefully argue your answer.
e) How much demand is firm A facing in the Cournot Nash equilibrium?

Solutions

Expert Solution

Two firms are A and B with costs CA(q1) = q1 and CB(q2) = 2q2. Firm A has a marginal cost of 1 while B has a marginal cost of 2. The two firms compete in quantities

The market demand function is P = 31 – 2Q

Where Q is the sum of each firm’s output q1 and q2.

Find the best response functions for both firms:

a) Revenue for firm A

R1 = P*q1 = (31 – 2(q1 + q2))*q1 =31q1 – 2q12 – 2q1q2.

Firm 1 has the following marginal revenue and marginal cost functions:

MR1 = 31 – 4q1 – 2q2

MC1 = 1

Profit maximization implies:

MR1 = MC1

31 – 4q1 – 2q2 = 1

which gives the best response function:

q1 = 7.5 - 0.5q2.

b) Find the best response functions for firm B

Revenue for firm B

R2 = P*q2 = (31 – 2(q1 + q2))*q2 =31q2 – 2q22 – 2q1q2.

Firm B has the following marginal revenue and marginal cost functions:

MR2 = 31 – 4q2 – 2q1

MC2 = 2

Profit maximization implies:

MR2 = MC2

31 – 4q1 – 2q2 = 2

which gives the best response function:

q2 = 7.25 - 0.5q1.

c) Solve the two equations

q2 = 7.25 - 0.5*(7.5 - 0.5q2)

q2 = 3.5 + 0.25q2

This gives q2 = 4.667 and q1 =  7.5 - 0.5*4.6667 = 5.167

d) Price = 31 - 2*( 4.667 + 5.167) = 11.33

e) Demand is P = 31 - 2q1 - 2*4.667

P = 21.67 - 2q1

This is the required demand.


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