In: Economics
Find all Nash equilibria in the following three simultaneous-move games:
Game 1 :
Column
Left Center Right
Up 3,1 4,2 3,3
High 5,7 1,3 2,4
Low 6,1 2,5 3,4
Down 1,1 4,6 5,2
Game 2:
Left Right
Up 2,4 7,7
Down 3,12 5,8
Game 3:
Left Right
Up 2,4 3,3
Down . 6,0 1,5
Game 1:
Let player 1 choose Up, Player 2's best response is Right
(3).
Let player 1 choose High, Player 2's best response is Left
(7).
Let player 1 choose Low, Player 2's best response is Center
(5).
Let player 1 choose Down, Player 2's best response is Center
(6).
Let player 2 choose Left, Player 1's best response is Low
(6).
Let player 2 choose Center, Player 1's best response is Up and Down
(4).
Let player 2 choose Right, Player 1's best response is Down
(5).
so, the Nash equilibrium is (Down, Center) = (4,6) as best response
of both players occur simultaneously at this set.
Game 2:
Let player 1 choose Up, Player 2's best response is Right
(7).
Let player 1 choose Down, Player 2's best response is Left
(12).
Let player 2 choose Left, player 1's best response is Down
(3).
Let player 2 choose Right, player 1's best response is Up
(7).
So, there are 2 Nash equilibria. They are (Up, Right) = (7,7) and
(Down, Right) = (3,12) as best response of both players occur
simultaneously at these sets.
Game 3:
Let player 1 choose Up, Player 2's best response is Left (4).
Let player 1 choose Down, Player 2's best response is Right
(5).
Let player 2 choose Left, player 1's best response is Down
(6).
Let player 2 choose Right, player 1's best response is Up
(3).
So, there is no Nash equilibria as best response of both players
never occur simultaneously.