Compute the Nash equilibria of the following location game. There are two people who simultaneously select...

Compute the Nash equilibria of the following location game. There are two

people who simultaneously select numbers between zero and one. Suppose

player 1 chooses s1 and player 2 chooses s2 . If si < sj , then player i gets a

payoff of (si + sj )>2 and player j obtains 1 − (si + sj )>2, for i = 1, 2. If

s1 = s2 , then both players get a payoff of 1>2.

Expert Solution

Rahul Sunny answered 2 years ago

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