Question

In: Economics

1. In a Bertrand model with identical firms and a non-differentiated product, price will increase in...

1. In a Bertrand model with identical firms and a non-differentiated product, price will increase in response to:

a-) an increase in the number of firms.

b-) a decrease in the number of firms.

c-) an increase in marginal cost.

d-) a decrease in marginal cost.

2. Which of the following is not a feature of the Cournot model?

a Group of answer choices

b In a Cournot equilibrium, neither firm can change its production and make more profit.

c In a Cournot equilibrium the firms are working together to make the most profit possible.

d As the number of firms in the market increases the Cournot equilibrium price approaches the perfectly competitive price.

e If the number of the firms in the market decreases to one, the Cournot equi- librium price is just monopoly price.

f more than one of the above is incorrect

3. Assuming a homogeneous product, the Bertrand equilibrium price is

a independent of the number of firms

b independent of the firm's marginal costs

c equal to the Cournot equilibrium price

d equal to the monopoly price

Solutions

Expert Solution

1.

In a Bertrand Competition, with non-differentiated product, the Nash Equilibrium occurs when:

P1 = P2 = ...... = Pn = Marginal Cost

where n = # of firms

So, Price increases in response in increase in the Marginal Cost.

Option c. is correct

2.

In cournot model, every firm at nash equilibrium produces optmial quantity of goods and has no incentive to deviate. If deviation occurs that the profits can be increased. So, option b. is a feature of Cournot Model

As n tends to infinity, price = MC in a Cournot competition. So, option d. is also a feature of Cournot Competition.

Cournot Game is a simultaneous move game. Firms do not cooperate and play their individual strategies. So, option c. is not a feature of Cournot Competition

Hence, option c. is the correct choice

3.

In market with homogenous product, the Bertrand equilibrium price = Marginal Cost. So, it is independent of the number of firms. Option a. is correct

Bertrand equilibrium price is less than the Cournot price and the monopoly price. So, option c and d are incorrect

Option a. is the correct choice

**if you liked the answer, then please upvote. Would be motivating for me. Thanks.


Related Solutions

Assume in a Bertrand model, there are 3 identical firms in the market with the same...
Assume in a Bertrand model, there are 3 identical firms in the market with the same constant marginal cost of 30. The demand function is P = 150 ? Q. Firms share the monopoly profit equally if they participate in the cartel. With probability 0.3 the cartel is detected by the end of period t, in which case each cartel member has to pay the fine $1000. Cartel investigation takes one period. If detected by the end of period t,...
Two firms sell an identical product and engage in simultaneous-move price competition (i.e., Bertrand competition). Market...
Two firms sell an identical product and engage in simultaneous-move price competition (i.e., Bertrand competition). Market demand is Q = 20 – P. Firm A has marginal cost of $1 per unit and firm B has marginal cost of $2 per unit. In equilibrium, firm A charges PA = $1.99(…) and firm B charges PB = $2.00 A clever UNC alum has patented a cost-saving process that can reduce marginal cost to zero. The UNC alum is willing to license...
Two identical firms compete in a Bertrand duopoly. The firms produce identical products at the same...
Two identical firms compete in a Bertrand duopoly. The firms produce identical products at the same constant marginal cost of MC = $10. There are 2000 identical consumers, each with the same reservation price of $30 for a single unit of the product (and $0 for any additional units). Under all of the standard assumptions made for the Bertrand model, the equilibrium prices would be Group of answer choices $10 for both firms $30 for both firms $50 for both...
1. According to the model of Bertrand price competition, competing firms will set prices according to...
1. According to the model of Bertrand price competition, competing firms will set prices according to which rule: marginal revenue equal marginal cost marginal revenue equal to average cost price equal to marginal revenue price equal to marginal cost price equal to average cost 2. There are 2 firms that sell a certain software, Microsoft and Oracle. Microsoft invented the software and so they act as a market leader by first deciding how much of the software they are going...
Consider the following one-shot Bertrand game. Two identical firms produce an identical product at zero cost....
Consider the following one-shot Bertrand game. Two identical firms produce an identical product at zero cost. The aggregate market demand curve is given by 6 − p , where p is the price facing the consumers. The two firms simultaneously choose prices once. Suppose further that the firm that charges the lower price gets the entire market and if both charge the same price they share the market equally. Assume that prices can only be quoted in integer units (only...
Bertrand Price Competition Model: Suppose there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2. They produce...
Bertrand Price Competition Model: Suppose there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2. They produce a slightly differentiated product. The demand for the two products is given respectively by: Q1 = 12 – 2P1 + P2 Q2 = 12 – 2P2 + P1 Suppose each firm’s TFC = $20 and MC = $1 The firm’s compete in prices. Firm 1 chooses P1 to maximize its profit and Firm 2 chooses P2 to maximize profits. Find P1, P2, Q1, Q2
1. Consider a differentiated Bertrand market with three firms, whose demand curves are: Q1 = 300-10P1+3P2...
1. Consider a differentiated Bertrand market with three firms, whose demand curves are: Q1 = 300-10P1+3P2 +2P3 Q2 = 300-8P2 +2P1 + P3 Q3= 50-3P3+P1+P2. Firms 1 and 2 both have marginal costs of 10 and Firm 3 has a marginal cost of 15. a. Calculate the equilibrium prices and quantities. b. Calculate the market shares. c. By specific reference to the HMGLs, would the two lead federal agencies be likely to regard a merger between Firm 2 and Firm...
Two firms are price-competing as in the standard Bertrand model. Each faces the market demand function...
Two firms are price-competing as in the standard Bertrand model. Each faces the market demand function D(p)=50-p. Firm 1 has constant marginal cost c1=10 and firm 2 has c2=20. As usual, if one of the firms has the lower price, they capture the entire market, and when they both charge exactly the same price they share the demand equally. 1. Suppose A1=A2={0.00, 0.01, 0.02,...,100.00}. That is, instead of any real number, we force prices to be listed in whole cents....
Q2. Consider a Bertrand game with differentiated products in which two firms simul- taneously choose prices....
Q2. Consider a Bertrand game with differentiated products in which two firms simul- taneously choose prices. The marginal cost for each firm is zero and there are no fixed costs. The demand functions for each firm are: Q1 = 80 − 2P1 + 2P2, Q2 = 80 − 2P2 + 2P1. where P1 is the price set by firm 1, P2 is the price set by firm 2, Q1 is the quantity demanded of firm 1’s product and Q2 is...
Consider a differentiated Bertrand market with three firms, whose demand curves are: Q1 = 300-10P1+3P2 +2P3...
Consider a differentiated Bertrand market with three firms, whose demand curves are: Q1 = 300-10P1+3P2 +2P3 Q2 = 300-8P2 +2P1 + P3 Q3= 50-3P3+P1+P2. Firms 1 and 2 both have marginal costs of 10 and Firm 3 has a marginal cost of 15. P1 = 26.80; P2 = 28.66; P3 = 25.07. a. Calculate the market shares of each product If Firm 2 and 3 merge Firm 3’s marginal cost will fall to 10 as a result of the merger....
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT