Consider a modified example from class. There are 3 Cournot competitors in the market with P(Q)...

Consider a modified example from class. There are 3 Cournot competitors in the market with P(Q) = 20 − Q. Marginal costs are MC1(q1) = 10 − q1, MC2(q2) = 9 and MC3(q3) = 6. Firms 1 and 2 decide to merge. Does firm 3 win or lose from this merger?

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Rahul Sunny answered 10 months ago

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