In: Economics
1
However, if they merge then the marginal production costs would fall to 5.
Given market demand function is P=100-Q, firm1 has marginal cost MC1= 5 firm2 has MC2=25
after merger marginal cost is MC=5
Following working shows when firms compete under cournot model. Firm1 able to sell quantity = 38.33 and firm2 can sell q2= 18.33, both at price= 43.34. After merger firm2 benefits as its marginal cost reduces to 5 from 25.
A(ii) quantity after merger has reduced and price level has increased as can be seen from the above calculation, thus it is not pareto optimal.
B (i)
Above is the derivation of lerner's index. Under Bertrand model, having product differentiation (imperfect substitutes) firms sell goods at prices more than marginal cost at equilibrium and this aligns with of the character of monopoly. As per lerner's index firm can charge prices more than marginal cost upto the point where MC=0 i.e. lerner index =1.
B(ii) Since lerner index is inverse of the elasticity of demand (which is an indicator of market power) it can be said if elasticity of demand is low then firm can charge higher prices.
In monpoly with no close substitutes elasticity of demand is low i.e.market power is high then firms are in position to charge higher prices