Question

In: Statistics and Probability

Problem 1. An “antique” table is for sale in a sealed bid auction. It will go...

Problem 1. An “antique” table is for sale in a sealed bid auction. It will go to the high bidder at the price the high bidder bids. You don’t know if it is a fake or not, but you do know that 20% of all antiques that look like this one are fakes. You are not able to have an appraiser examine it. If it is a fake, you will know this after you buy it and it will be worthless to you. If it is real, it will be worth $1,000 to you.

You know that the only other possible bidder is an expert antique dealer has also looked at this table and you know that this dealer can always tell a fake from a real antique. You know that if the antique dealer finds that it is a fake, she will bid zero for it. If she finds that it is real, she will bid $500 for it if she has a similar table in stock, and will $800 for it if she has another table like it in stock. Suppose that you believe that it is equally likely that the dealer has another table like it in stock.

A) What do you believe is the probability that the antique dealer will bid $500 for the table? What do you believe is the probability that she will bid $800 for the table?

B) If you bid $300 for the table and you are the high bidder, what is your probability that the table is a genuine antique? What is your expected profit (or loss) if you bid $300?

C) If you bid $501 for the table, what is the probability that you will be the high bidder. What is the probability that the table is genuine if you bid $501 and are the high bidder? What is your expected profit (or loss) if you bid $501?

D) If you bid $801 for the table, what is the probability that you will be the high bidder? What is your expected value for the table if you are the high bidder? What is your expected profit (or loss) if you bid $801?

E) Suppose you could choose to bid any amount between 0 and $1000 for the table. What bid would maximize your expected payoff? Explain your answer.

Solutions

Expert Solution

Probability that the antique is fake = 0.2
=> Probability that antique is genuine = 0.8

Probability (expert bids 0) = 0.2
Probability (expert bids $500) = P(antique is genuine & similar table in stock) = P(genuine) * P(similar) = 0.8*1/2 = 0.4
Probability (expert bids $800) = P(genuine & not similar) = P(genuine)*P(not similar) = 0.8*1/2 = 0.4

A) P(Antique dealer bids $500) = 0.4 (as calculated above)
P(Antique dealer bids $800) = 0.4 (as calculated above)

B) Our bid = $300
P(genuine | $300 is high bid) = P(genuine & $300 is high bid) / P($300 is high bid)

But we know that, if antique is genuine, antique dealer bids either $500 or $800. Thus $300 cannot be the high bid. Thus P(genuine & $300 is high bid) = 0.
Hence antique is definitely fake.

Expected profit/loss = (1000-300)*P(genuine) + (-300)*P(fake) = 0 + -300 = $ -300 (loss)

C) If we bid $501, to be the high bidder, the antique dealer must not bid $800. In all other cases, we are the highest bidder.
Thus P($501 high bid) = P(antique dealer does not bid $800) = 1 - P(dealer bids $800) = 1-0.4 = 0.6

P(genuine | $501 is high bid) = P(genuine & $501 is high bid) / P($501 is high bid) = 0.8*1/2 / 0.6 = 2/3
This result can be obtained by Bayes Theorem too
P(genuine | 501 high) = P(501 high | genuine) * P(genuine)/ [ P(501 high | genuine)*P(genuine) + P(501 high | fake)*P(fake) ]
= 0.5*0.8 / (0.5*0.8 + 1*0.2) = 2/3

E(profit) = (1000-501)*0.4 + 0*0.4 + -501*0.2 = $ 99.4 (profit)

D) P($801 is high) = 1
E(profit) = (1000-801)*0.8 + -801*0.2 = $ -1 (loss)
Expected profit is always the same as $801 is high bid with probability 1

E)


Related Solutions

Question 6. There are two bidders in a sealed-bid, second-price auction. The object for sale has...
Question 6. There are two bidders in a sealed-bid, second-price auction. The object for sale has a common value. Each bidder, i = 1,2, receives a signal i that is independently and uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. The true value of the object, v, is the average of the two signals, v = (σ1 + σ2) / 2 (a) If bidder 1 gets the signal σ = 0.7, how much does he think the object is worth? (b)...
A second-price sealed-bid auction is an auction in which every bidder submits his or her bid...
A second-price sealed-bid auction is an auction in which every bidder submits his or her bid to the auctioneer, the auctioneer announces the winner to be the bidder who submits the highest bid, and the winner pays the highest bid among the losers. Is the following statement True, False, or Uncertain? Explain why. Every player has a weakly dominant strategy in second-price auction.
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain...
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an indivisible object. Denote by vi the value player i attaches to the object; if she obtains the object at the price p her payoff is vi −p. Assume that the players’ valuations of the object are all different and all positive; number the players 1 through n in such a way that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn > 0....
Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the winning bidder pays the average of the two highest...
Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the winning bidder pays the average of the two highest bids. As in the auction models considered in class, assume that players have valuations v1 > v2 > ... > vn, that ties are won by the tied player with the highest valuation, and that each player’s valuation is common knowledge. Is there any Nash equilibrium in which the two highest bids are different? If there is, give an example. If there is not,...
Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the seller draws one of the N bids at random....
Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the seller draws one of the N bids at random. The buyer whose bid was drawn wins the auction and pays the amount bid. Assume that buyer valuations follow a uniform(0,1) distribution. 1. What is the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy b(v)? 2.What is the seller’s expected revenue? 3.Why doesn’t this auction pay the seller the same revenue as the four standard auctions? That is, why doesn’t the revenue equivalence theorem apply here? Be specific.
Suppose a single good is being sold in a sealed-bid auction (no bidder can observe the...
Suppose a single good is being sold in a sealed-bid auction (no bidder can observe the bids of other bidders). The rules of the auction are such that the person who bids the highest value for the good wins, but the winner only has to pay the value of the second-highest bid submitted. Assume that there are three people bidding for the good (?=1,2,3), and each values the good according to: ?1=$12 ?2=$16 ?3=$3 where ??v_i is the maximum willingness...
Game theory: Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the winning bidder pays the average of the...
Game theory: Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the winning bidder pays the average of the two highest bids. Assume that players have valuations v1 > v2 > … > vn, that ties are won by the tied player with the highest valuation, and that each player’s valuation is common knowledge. a. Is there any Nash equilibrium in which the two highest bids are different? If there is, give an example. If there is not, prove that no such equilibrium...
a) Your company is bidding for a service contract in a first-price sealed-bid auction. You value...
a) Your company is bidding for a service contract in a first-price sealed-bid auction. You value the contract at $12 million. You believe the distribution of bids will be uniform, with a high value of $16 million and a low value of $3 million. What is your optimal strategy with 5 bidders? b) Your company is bidding for a service contract in a first-price sealed-bid auction. You value the contract at $12 million. You believe the distribution of bids will...
Find a Nash Equilibrium of the second price sealed bid auction that is different from [v1,v2,v3,....,vn]
Find a Nash Equilibrium of the second price sealed bid auction that is different from [v1,v2,v3,....,vn]
Consider 45 risk-neutral bidders who are participating in a second-price, sealed-bid auction. It is commonly known...
Consider 45 risk-neutral bidders who are participating in a second-price, sealed-bid auction. It is commonly known that bidders have independent private values. Based on this information, we know the optimal bidding strategy for each bidder is to: A. bid their own valuation of the item. B. shade their bid to just below their own valuation. C. bid according to the following bid function: b = v − (v − L)/n. D. bid one penny above their own valuation to ensure...
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT