An industry has two firms. The inverse demand function for this
industry is p = 74...
An industry has two firms. The inverse demand function for this
industry is p = 74 - 4q. Both firms produce at a constant unit cost
of $14 per unit. What is the Cournot equilibrium price for this
industry?
Two firms operate in an industry with inverse demand given by p
= 12 – q. each firm operates with constant marginal cost equal to 0
and fixed cost equal to 4. Firms compete by setting the quantity to
sell in the market . A) Determine the best reply function of each
firm. b) Determine what are in equilibrium the quantities offered
by each firm, the market price and the profits obtained by each
firm. Assume now N firms operate...
6. Assume an industry with two firms facing an inverse market
demand of P = 100 - Q. The product is homogeneous, and each firm
has a cost function of 600 + 10q + 0.25q2. Assume firms agree to
equally share the market. a. Derive each firm’s demand curve. b.
Find each firm’s preferred price when it faces the demand curve in
part a. Now assume that firm 1’s cost function is instead 25q +
0.5q2 while firm 2’s is...
Two firms compete as a Stackellberg duopoly. The inverse
market demand function they face is P = 65 – 3Q. The cost function
for each firm is C(Q) = 11Q. The outputs of the two firms
are
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the
inverse demand function is P = 10 -2Q (quantity is measured in
millions). Firm 1 has been in business for one year, while Firm 2
just recently entered the market. Each firm has a legal obligation
to pay one year’s rent of $0.5 million regardless of its production
decision. Firm 1’s marginal cost is $2, and Firm 2’s marginal cost
is $6. The current market price is $8 and was...
Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The inverse market
demand function they face is P = 65 – 3Q. The cost function for
each firm is C(Q) = 11Q. The outputs of the two firms are
QL = 9, QF = 4.5
QL = 9, QF = 10.5
QL = 6, QF = 3
QL = 4, QF = 2
Please help/ explain. Thank you
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with
inverse demand function P = 600 − 3Q. Each firm produces at a
constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this
information to compare the output levels and profits in settings
characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive
behavior.
Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the
inverse demand function is P = 20 -5Q (quantity
is measured in millions). Firm 1 has been in business for one year,
while Firm 2 just recently entered the market. Each firm has a
legal obligation to pay one year’s rent of $1 million regardless of
its production decision. Firm 1’s marginal cost is $2, and Firm 2’s
marginal cost is $10. The current market price is $15 and was...
2) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse
demand function p = 500 – 2Q. Their cost function is c
(qi) = 20 + 4qi2 for i = a, b.
Calculate the profit maximizing price output combination. (3)
3) Two firms, a and b, in a Cournot oligopoly face the inverse
demand function p = 25 – Q. Their cost function is c
(qi) = 0.5*qi for i = a,
b. Calculate the profit maximizing price output
combination. (3)
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with
inverse demand function P = 400 – 2Q. Each firm produces
at a constant marginal cost of $50 and has no fixed costs -- both
firms have a cost function C(Q) = 50Q.
If the market is defined as a Bertrand Oligopoly, what is the
market price?
Refer to the information above.
What is the total amount of Q produced in this market?
How much does firm 1...