Two games that differ only in the timing of moves—one simultaneous, the other sequential move—can sometimes...

Two games that differ only in the timing of moves—one simultaneous, the other sequential move—can sometimes have completely different subgame-perfect equilibria. Why?

A. A simultaneous game has only one subgame while a sequential game has several.

B. The second mover cannot choose non-credible threats in the SPE of a sequential game.

C. A NE can never be also an SPE.

D. None of the other answers provided is correct.

E. The question does not make sense. Subgame-perfect equilibrium cannot be applied to simultaneous games.

Expert Solution

Two games that differ only in the timing of moves—one simultaneous, the other sequential move—can sometimes have completely different subgame-perfect equilibria.

According to me, The question does not make sense. This is because Subgame-perfect equilibrium cannot be applied to simultaneous games as in a simultaneous move game there is only one sub game which is the original game itself so we cant apply SPE in a simultaneous move game.

The subgame perfect equilibria is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game.

Rahul Sunny answered 1 year ago

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Two games that differ only in the timing of moves—one simultaneous, the other sequential move—can sometimes...

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