Question

In: Economics

There are two Cournot competitors, A & B. Each has total cost of 12x, where x...

There are two Cournot competitors, A & B. Each has total cost of 12x, where x is a firm’s output,

and demand is X = 400 – P, where P is market price. What will market price be in equilibrium?

(a.) $239.8

(b.) $141.3

(c.) $130

(d.) $208

Graph it with labels, thanks!

Solutions

Expert Solution

The market demand and costs of the duopolists are the following

P = 400 – (XA + XB)

C1 = 12XA

C2 = 12XB

The profits of the duopolists are

ΠA = PXA – CA = [400 – (XA + XB)]XA – 12XA

ΠA = 400 XA – X2A – XAXB – 12XA

ΠA = 388XA – X2A – XAXB

ΠB = PXB – CB = [400 – (XA + XB)]XB – 12XB

ΠB = 400XB – XAXB – X2B – 12XB

ΠB = 388XB – XAXB – X2B

For profit maximization under the Cournot assumption we have

∂ΠA/∂XA = 0 = 388 – 2XA – XB

∂ΠB/∂XB = 0 = 388 – 2XB – XA

The reaction functions are

XA = 194 – 0.5XB

XB = 194 – 0.5XA

Replacing XB into the XA reaction function we get

XA = 194 – 0.5(194 – 0.5XA)

XA = 194 – 97 + 0.25XA

XA = 129.33

And

XB = 194 – 0.5XA

XB = 194 – 0.5(129.33)

XB = 194 – 64.67

XB = 129.33

Thus, the total output in the market is

X = XA + XB = 129.33 + 129.33 = 258.66

And the market price

P = 400 – X

P = 400 – 258.66

P = 141.3

Equilibrium price is $141.3


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