Question

In: Economics

The geegaw industry consists of two Cournot competitors producing an identical product. The inverse demand equation...

The geegaw industry consists of two Cournot competitors producing an identical product. The inverse demand equation is

P=591-4Q.

            The total cost equations of the two firms are:

TC1=15Q1;

TC2=31Q2.

            a.         Determine the total revenue equation for each firm.

            b.         What is the reaction function of each firm?

            c.          What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium level of output?

            d.         What is the market-determined price of geegaws?

            e.         Calculate each firm’s total profit.

Solutions

Expert Solution

The geegaw industry consists of two Cournot competitors producing an identical product.

The inverse demand function is given as

P = 591 - 4.Q = 591 - 4.(Q1+Q2)

Where, Q1 is output of Firm 1 and Q2 is output of Firm 2.

(a) Hence, Total Revenue for firm 1 is

TR1 = P.Q1 = [591 - 4.(Q1+Q2)].Q1

or,

This is the total revenue equation for Firm 1.

And, Total Revenue for Firm 2 is

TR2 = P.Q2 = [591 - 4.(Q1+Q2)].Q2

or,

This is the total revenue euation for Firm 2.

(b) Now, we will calculate the Marginal Revenue equations from TR1 and TR2.

Marginal Revenue for Firm 1 is

MR1 = dTR1/dQ1 = 591 - 8.Q1 - 4.Q2........(1)

MR2 = dTR2/dQ2 = 591 - 4.Q1 - 8.Q2........(2)

Total Cost of Firm 1 is: TC1 = 15.Q1

Total Cost of Firm 2 is: TC2 = 31.Q2

Marginal Cost of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are,

MC1 = dTC1/dQ1 = 15.......(3)

MC2 = dTC2/dQ2 = 31.......(4)

Now, at Cournot competition the firms will maximize their profits. Hence, they will set their Marginal Costs equal to their Marginal Revenue to maximize profit.

Hence, for firm 1

MR1 = MC1

or, 591 - 8.Q1 - 4.Q2 = 15

or, Q1 = 72 - 0.5.Q2...........RF1

This is the reaction function for firm 1.

Also, fo Firm 2

MR2 = MC2

or, 591 - 4.Q1 - 8.Q2 = 31

or, Q2 = 70 - 0.5.Q1............RF2

This is the reaction function for firm 2.

(c) Now, solving the two functions RF1 and RF2, we get

Q1* = 49.33 and Q2* = 45.33

Hence, Cournot-Nash Equilibrum output for Firm 1 and Firm 2 is (Q1*, Q2*) = (49.33, 45.33).

Hence, Total Output at Cournot Nash Equilibrium is: Q* = Q1*+Q2* = 49.33+45.33

or, Q* = 94.66

(d) Hence, the market -determined price for geegaws is

P* = 591 - 4.Q* = 591 - 4×94.66

or, P* = 212.36

Hence, market determined price for geegaws is P*=212.36.

(e) The Total Revenue and Total Cost of Firm 1 are

TR1 = P*.Q1* = 212.36×49.33

or, TR1 = 10475.72

And, TC1 = 15.Q1* = 15×49.33

or, TC1 = 739.95

Hence, Profit of Firm 1 is

π1 = TR1 - TC1 = 10475.72 - 739.95

or, π1 = 9735.77

Profit of Firm 1 is 9735.77.

Also, Total Revenue and Total Cost for firm 2 are,

TR2 = P*.Q2* = 212.36×45.33

or, TR2 = 9626.28

And, TC2 = 31.Q2* = 31×45.33

or, TC2 = 1405.23

Also, Profit of Firm 2 is

π2 = TR2 - TC2 = 9626.28 - 1403.23

or, π2 = 8223.05

Profit of Firm 2 is 8223.05.

Hope the solutions are clear to you my friend.


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