In: Economics
Green Valley Water and Granite Slope Water are sellers of spring water in the Republic of Bogritania. Like mineral water sellers in many simple examples, they have no costs so their payoffs are the revenues they obtain from selling water. The price of mineral water in Bogritania is 1,000-qv-qs , where qv is the quantity sold by Green Valley and qs is the quantity sold by Granite Slope. As a result:
Proposition A: Each firm's best response is to sell exactly half the amount left over by the other firm: for example, the best response qv is qv= 1/2(1,000-qs)
A. Determine the Nash Equilibrium for this duopoly.
B. Bones question. Using calculus: demonstrate why Proposition A must be true
Ans.
Assume the price P = 1000 - Q
Where Q = qv + qs = total quantity produced.
Also given that TCv = TCs = 0 (cost of both firms is zero)
Consider profit as πv for green valley water and πs for granite slope water.
A.
Profit for Green valley water is
πv = P(qv) - TCV = (1000 - qv - qs)qv
Similarly we get
πs = (1000 - qv - qs)qs
Nash equilibrium is a pair of quantities where one player doesn't want to make a move keeping the other player quantity constant because his profit will be decreased.
That means partial differentiation of profit of green valley water with the quantity of green valley water should be zero. (This rule also goes for granite slope water)
Partial differential of πv with respect to qv = 0
1000 - 2qv - qs = 0. -(1)
Similarly applying same condition on granite slope water we get
1000 - 2qs - qv = 0. -(2)
Solving (1) &(2) we get
qv = qs = (1000/3).
Therefore (qv,qs) = (1000/3,1000/3) is the Nash equilibrium.
B.
From answer A equation (1)
1000 - 2qv - qs = 0
qv = (1000 - qs) / 2. Will be the best response of the green valley water if we know qs value.
*Note : equation (1) from answer A is only considered because best response function can only be achieved by keeping the other quantity constant and (1) is the only case where qs kept as a constant and changing qv.