Question

In: Economics

Consider the following pricing game between Staples and Dunder-Mifflin. The payoffs below are profits presented in...

  1. Consider the following pricing game between Staples and Dunder-Mifflin. The payoffs below are profits presented in $100,000’s, with the order [Dunder-Mifflin, Staples].

Staples

Low

Medium

High

Dunder-Mifflin

Low

1, 0

1, 2

0, 1

Medium

0, 0

2, 1

3, 3

High

1, 2

1, 1

0, 1

  1. Find all Nash equilibria.
  2. Provide an argument for selecting among those equilibria.

Solutions

Expert Solution


Related Solutions

Consider the following pricing game between Staples and Dunder-Mifflin. The payoffs below are profits presented in...
Consider the following pricing game between Staples and Dunder-Mifflin. The payoffs below are profits presented in $100,000’s, with the order [Dunder-Mifflin, Staples] Staples Low Medium High Low 1,0 1,2 0,1 Dunder-Mifflin Medium 0,0 2,1 3,3 High 1,2 1,1 0,1 Find all Nash equilibria. Provide an argument for selecting among those equilibria.
Consider the infinite repetition of the game below. For LRA payoffs, find the full set of...
Consider the infinite repetition of the game below. For LRA payoffs, find the full set of (long-run) equilibrium payoffs. Find the set of discount factors λ ε (0,1) for which cooperation (with 6,6 as payoffs) can be sustained by reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium as a threat.
Dunder Mifflin had the following balances in selected accounts at the end of 2015 and 2016....
Dunder Mifflin had the following balances in selected accounts at the end of 2015 and 2016. 2015 2016 Cash $58,000 $45,000 Short-term investments 46,000 39,000 Accounts receivable 54,000 61,000 Allowance for uncollectible accounts 3,500 5,000 Inventory 78,000 98,000 Accounts payable 91,000 102,000 Wages payable 17,000 25,000 Income tax payable 4,500 6,500 Note payable (due 2022) 100,000 100,000 Sales 415,000 525,000 Cost of goods sold 225,000 304,000 The accounts receivable at the end of 2014 were $50,000 and the allowance for...
Question 3 Dunder Mifflin had the following balances in selected accounts at the end of 2015...
Question 3 Dunder Mifflin had the following balances in selected accounts at the end of 2015 and 2016. 2015 2016 Cash $58,000 $45,000 Short-term investments 46,000 39,000 Accounts receivable 54,000 61,000 Allowance for uncollectible accounts 3,500 5,000 Inventory 78,000 98,000 Accounts payable 91,000 102,000 Wages payable 17,000 25,000 Income tax payable 4,500 6,500 Note payable (due 2022) 100,000 100,000 Sales 415,000 525,000 Cost of goods sold 225,000 304,000 The accounts receivable at the end of 2014 were $50,000 and the...
A game of chance offers the following odds and payoffs:
A game of chance offers the following odds and payoffs:Probability         Payoff0.2                      $5000.4                        1000.4                 0a) What is the expected cash payoff?b) Suppose each play of the game costs $100. What is the expected rate of return?c) What is the variance of the expected returns?d) What is the standard deviation of the expected returns?
11.       In the following game, numbers on the left of the comma are payoffs to A;...
11.       In the following game, numbers on the left of the comma are payoffs to A; numbers on the right are payoffs to B. Identify the Nash equilibria, if any. A/B B1 B2 B3          A1 5,6 3,5 0,4          A2 6,7 3,9 5,2          A3 7,5 4,4 4,3          A4 3,8 7,2 6,8
A game of chance offers the following odds and payoffs. Each play of the game costs...
A game of chance offers the following odds and payoffs. Each play of the game costs $100, so the net profit per play is the payoff less $100. Probability Payoff Net Profit 0.10 $700 $600 0.50 100 0 0.40 0 –100 a-1. What is the expected cash payoff? (Round your answer to the nearest whole dollar amount.) a-2. What is the expected rate of return? (Enter your answer as a percent rounded to the nearest whole number.) b-1. What is...
Consider the following two-stage entry-pricing game between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant: 2 players:...
Consider the following two-stage entry-pricing game between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant: 2 players: {incumbent, entrant} Two-stage game: Stage-1: Potential entrant makes its entry decision by choosing from {Enter, Do not enter}; Stage-2: The incumbent and the new entrant engage in simultaneous-move pricing game. If the potential entrant chooses to enter, she must incur a one-time fixed cost of entry, f, prior to engaging in price competition. This cost includes the advertising and marketing expenses which must be...
From the following payoff matrix, where the payoffs are the profits or losses of the two...
From the following payoff matrix, where the payoffs are the profits or losses of the two firms, determine (a) whether Firm A has a dominant strategy, (b) whether Firm B has a dominant strategy, and (c) the optimal strategy for each firm. Explain. Firm B Low price High price Firm A Low price (1, 1) (3, -2) High price (-2, 3) (2, 2) Prisoner’s Dilemma
Consider the following game. Player 1’s payoffs are listed first:                        Player 2 X Y Player...
Consider the following game. Player 1’s payoffs are listed first:                        Player 2 X Y Player 1 A 90 , 1 10 , 0 B 10 , 0 50 , 1 C 100 , 0 80 , 1 Imagine that player 1 makes a decision first and Player 2 makes a decision after observing player 1’s choice. What is the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game? Imagine that player 2 makes a decision first and Player 1 makes a decision after...
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT