Consider the infinite repetition of the game below. For LRA payoffs, find the full set of...

Consider the infinite repetition of the game below.
For LRA payoffs, find the full set of (long-run) equilibrium payoffs.
Find the set of discount factors λ ε (0,1) for which cooperation (with 6,6 as payoffs) can be sustained by reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium as a threat.

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Rahul Sunny answered 1 year ago

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