In: Accounting
Philippa Foot argues that Kant wrongly views morality as a matter of categorical (rather than hypothetical) imperatives. She believes that the imperatives of morality have a superior force to other imperatives because of the way they are taught. She allows that it has generally been supposed that the one right thing that is in Kant's moral philosophy is his claim that moral imperatives must be distinguished from hypothetical ones. Foot maintains, however, that moral judgments can (and should) be seen as hypothetical imperatives.
Hypothetical imperatives are defined: good to some purpose.
Foot argues that, contrary to commonly-held belief, moral judgments are not categorical imperatives, but rather are hypothetical imperatives like other judgments. Foot thinks this because she can see no basis for the claim that we always have a reason to obey moral rules. But if we do not always have a reason to obey, then it can be rational to ignore moral rules, and thus moral judgments cannot be categorical.
Foot discusses efforts to delimit the moral categorical imperative from other sorts, but believes that they all fail. The most basic theory about moral judgments is one about use: certainly, moral judgments are used categorically, as opposed to other sorts of judgments which tend to be hypothetical. Further, in certain circumstances, rules of etiquette are used categorically: when a man wants to disobey the rules of a club because he will never come back, nonetheless it is said he ought not to violate the club’s rules, despite his desires. So a theory of use cannot differentiate moral judgments from any other.
So, Foot concludes that if moral judgments are not categorical, then they must be hypothetical. She then disputes the notion that, if this were so, and if everybody believed it, it would have a corrosive impact upon morality. Foot thinks that Kant himself believed this because he was a psychological hedonist with regard to all actions except those which adhered to moral rules: when we are not obeying moral rules, we are always promoting our own self-interest. Foot thinks that the fact that Kant believed this blinded Kant to the possibility of non-binding reasons for being moral.