This question is about the sequential moves Stag Hunt game. There are two players. Player 1...

This question is about the sequential moves Stag Hunt game. There are two players. Player 1 moves first, player 2 observes player 1’s move, and then player 2 moves. Players get 10 jollies each if they both choose Stag; 5 jollies if they choose Hare; and 0 jollies if they choose Stag but the other player does not.
1. What is the set of (pure) strategies for player 1? What is the set of (pure) strategies for player 2?
2. Explain why player 2 has more pure strategies than player 1.
3. What is the set of SPNE in this game? What is the outcome of the game in this SPNE?
4. Why are the sets of SPNE in the extensive form, and of NE in the simultaneous move game in strategic form, different?
5. If the game were changed so player 2 moved first, would the SPNE outcome be different?

Expert Solution

Colby Messinger answered 2 years ago

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