Question

1. Could the outcome of the Iraq War have been better had the policymakers been better informed and the policies more skillfully implemented? Could anything change the outcome now?

2. How did the policy failures in post-war Iraq lead to the rise of ISIS? What are some of the continuing consequences?

3. What is climate change? Do you believe that climate change is happening? Why has climate change become so politicized? Why has the US been slow to respond to this global threat?

Answer 1

Ques 1

- The most serious issue with U.S. intelligence today is that its relationship with the policymaking procedure is broken and seriously needs fix. In the wake of the Iraq war, it has become certain that official intelligence investigation was not depended on in making even the most noteworthy national security choices, that intelligence was misused openly to justify choices previously made, that harming hostility created among policymakers and intelligence officials, and that the intelligence network's own work was politicized.

- Open discussion of prewar intelligence on Iraq has focused on the mistakes made in evaluating Saddam Hussein's offbeat weapons programs. A commission led by Judge Laurence Silberman and previous Senator Charles Robb usefully recorded the intelligence network's mix-ups in a strong and far reaching report discharged in March 2005. Revisions were to be sure all together, and the intelligence network has started to make them.

- Simultaneously, an acrimonious and exceptionally fanatic discussion broke out about whether the Bush organization controlled and misused intelligence in putting forth its defense for war.

- An especially significant arrangement of policy botches happened well in advance of the development to war itself.

- The direction of the U.S. equipped powers from counterinsurgency, the inability to set up a political settlement before attack, and other controllable policy decisions in the prewar period all prompted enormous troubles during the occupation itself.

- Thus, when of the attack, these policy decisions had become practically like auxiliary requirements and the disappointments had a snowballing impact, making policy redresses unmistakably progressively troublesome.