Question

How did Aristotle concieve of "instruments" and their activities ?

Answer 1

Aristotle conceives of ethical theory as a field distinct from the theoretical sciences.
Its methodology must match its subject matter—good action—and must respect the fact that
in this field many generalizations hold only for the most part. We study ethics in order
to improve our lives, and therefore its principal concern is the nature of human
well-being. Aristotle follows Socrates and Plato in taking the virtues to be central
to a well-lived life. Like Plato, he regards the ethical virtues (justice, courage,
temperance and so on) as complex rational, emotional and social skills. But he rejects
Plato's idea that to be completely virtuous one must acquire, through a training in the
sciences, mathematics, and philosophy, an understanding of what goodness is. What we need,
in order to live well, is a proper appreciation of the way in which such goods as
friendship, pleasure, virtue, honor and wealth fit together as a whole. In order to apply
that general understanding to particular cases, we must acquire, through proper upbringing
and habits, the ability to see, on each occasion, which course of action is best
supported by reasons. Therefore practical wisdom, as he conceives it, cannot be acquired
solely by learning general rules. We must also acquire, through practice, those deliberative,
emotional, and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being
into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion.

Plato once argued that justice should be placed in this category, but since it is generally
agreed that it is desirable for its consequences, he devotes most of his time to establishing
his more controversial point—that justice is to be sought for its own sake. By contrast,
Aristotle assumes that if A is desirable for the sake of B, then B is better than A ; therefore, the highest kind of good must be one that is not desirable for
the sake of anything else. To show that A deserves to be our ultimate end, one must
show that all other goods are best thought of as instruments that promote A in some way or
other. Since experience is what gives the principles of each science, logic can only be employed at a later stage to demonstrate conclusions from these starting points. This is why logic, though it is employed in all branches of philosophy, is not a part of philosophy. Rather, in the Aristotelian tradition, logic is an instrument for the philosopher, just as a hammer and anvil are instruments for the blacksmith (Ierodiakonou 1998).

When describing how serious good luck makes life more blessed, as in the other cases
considered here, Aristotle once again gives two distinct explanations for its value.
Aristotle explains: “for they provide a further natural ornament to happiness, and the use
of these is a fine thing and a matter of virtue” . The latter explanation here
seems to correspond closely to the use explanation that we encountered earlier, although
here Aristotle does not specify that such events are useful specifically as instruments. The
former explanation seems to match closely the so-called “second explanation” for how
lacking the external goods and suffering bad luck contribute to happiness. But here,
Aristotle is giving a description for how something outside a moral agent contributes to,
rather than detracts from, the quality of his life, so it may shed some additional light on
his remarks on the external goods.