Question

In: Economics

Consider a market where two firms sell an identical product to consumers and face the following...

Consider a market where two firms sell an identical product to consumers and face the
following inverse demand function p = 100 - q1 - q2
but the firms face different marginal costs. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC1 = 10
and firrm 2 has a constant marginal cost of MC2 = 40.

a) What is firm 1s best response function?

b) What is firm 2's best response function?

c) What are the equilibrium quantities, price and profits for both firms?

Solutions

Expert Solution

First firm’s marginal cost function is MC = 10 and second firm's MC = 40 and the market demand function is P = 100 – (q1 + q2) where Q is the sum of each firm’s output q1 and q2.

Find the best response functions for both firms:

a) Revenue for firm 1

R1 = P*q1 = (100 – (q1 + q2))*q1 = 100q1 – q12 – q1q2.

Firm 1 has the following marginal revenue and marginal cost functions:

MR1 = 100 – 2q1 – q2

MC1 = 10

Profit maximization implies:

MR1 = MC1

100 – 2q1 – q2 = 10

which gives the best response function:

q1 = 45 - 0.5q2.

Find the best response functions for firm 2:

b) MR2 = 100 – 2q2 – q1

MC2 = 40

Profit maximization implies:

MR2 = MC2

100 – 2q2 – q1= 40

which gives the best response function:

q2 = 30 - 0.5q1

c) Solve them to get

q2 = 30 - 0.5*(45 - 0.5q2)

q2 = 7.5 + 0.25q2

This gives q2 = 10 and q1 = 45 - 10*0.5 = 40 units Price = 100 - 50 = $50 Profit 1 = (50 - 10)*40 = 1600 and profit 2 = (50 - 40)*10 = 100.


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