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Compute the Shapley-Shubik power indices of the weighted voting system [8: 6, 4, 1], expressing your...

Compute the Shapley-Shubik power indices of the weighted voting system [8: 6, 4, 1], expressing your answers as fractions.

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Colby Messinger answered 2 years ago
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