Question

In: Economics

Consider an income weighted voting system. Each individuali with income yi has yi votes.

Consider an income weighted voting system. Each individuali with income yi has yi votes. There are n voters (with n odd). Is it possible for a Condorcet Loser to win an election under wealth-weighted voting? If it is possible, provide an example. If it is not possible, then provide a formal argument (proof). Can you think of a polity in which wealth-weighted voting (or something very close to it) is used?

Solutions

Expert Solution

In the event that the individual is a condorcet failure, he can just win iff the condorcet champ isn't partaking in the political decision.

This is since, supposing that singular X has Y riches and individual votes and individual A has B riches and along these lines B votes, and wherein Y>B then individual A can't win when X is additionally taking an interest in the elections.

In the event that there is no other applicant having more wealth  than X, at that point singular X will win the election  race and it is extremely unlikely that competitor A can win the election.

I don't have the wealth  idea whether riches is utilized as a weighted voting system some place or not, yet at times the past presentation decides the measure of casting a ballot rights given.

Like in the event of UEFA club competitions the nations are positioned by their past exhibitions in the opposition. The nations which are spoken to by the clubs performing admirably in the opposition beforehand, get the most groups in the following completion etc.


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