Question

You are an attorney, and Ms. Smith has hired you to file a law suit involving a car accident she was in.

The lawsuit would be against the other party in the

accident, Mr. Jones. Ms. Smith has provided you with

two documents. They are a police report, and a summary of her damages.

The police report lists the following facts: Smith ran a red light and entered an intersection. Mr. Jones, in

a second vehicle, had entered the intersection on a green light. Smith swerved to miss the car driven by

Jones, went off the road, and rolled ov

er several times. Smith’s car was completely destroyed and Smith

sustained substantial injuries. Jones was able to immediately stop, and neither his vehicle nor Jones

sustained any damages or injuries. Nevertheless, the officer did conclude that Jones h

ad been traveling at

an unsafe and excessive rate of speed and this had a marginal contribution to the accident. His overall

assessment was that Smith, your client, was responsible for 80% of the accident and Jones, the defendant,

was responsible for 20%.

Ms. Smith’s summary of damages lists the following: Ms. Smith has sustained medical expenses in the

amount of $70,000, pain and suffering damages in the amount of $20,000 and loss of her vehicle in the

amount of $10,000. Therefore, total damages are i

n the amount $100,000.

Assume the information provided in the police report and the summary of damages are accurate

(including the officer’s assessment of the percentage of fault for both Smith and Jones). Further assume

that the case would be filed in

California and based solely on California law.

Given these assumptions perform the following:

1. Brief the case of Li v. Yellow Cab (a copy of the case is located on Canvas); and

2. Based on the law you find in that case answer the following questio

n using the IRAC format (please

cite to Li v. Yellow Cab in the rule section of your answer):

If Ms. Smith were to prevail in a negligence action against Mr. Jones, what would she recover in

damages, if anything, and why?

Answer 1

The defendant charged the claimant as the plaintiff try to cross multiple lanes of incoming traffic to get into a gas station. There was incompetence on both sides. The trial court found that owing to their own exposure to wrongdoing, the complainant can not get a claim.

IRAC:

Issue. Could a person claim injury costs in a car crash even though he/she was reckless in a consequential way?

Rule of Law. The comparable negligence theory assesses damages in strict relation to blame. The law of contributory negligence "fully or none" as it truly exists in the state should be replaced by a principle of "true" comparative negligence, the basic object of which is to delegate blame and liability for harm in direction relative to the percentage of carelessness made by each party. Consequently, with any actions of neglect resulting from injuries to the individual or assets, the promissory estoppel of the person involved in the person or property shall not preclude healing, but the damages paid shall be limited in proportion to the degree of negligence attributed to the recoverer.

Analysis.

* The proportional negligence doctrine assesses the relative proportion of the risk to the damage. It is superior from the perspective of reasoning, empirical practice, and moral justice, to the theory of causative guilt "all-or-nothing." Promissory estoppel in its service is unfair as it fails to assign liability in relation to the error. In cases of contributory negligence, juries also require redress, and the settlement in the jury room results in mitigation of the damages attributable to the liability of the complainant. Twenty-five states also abolished either "fully or none" law of contributory responsibility and have enacted general compensation laws in its place to determine damages in relation to the damage.
* Nothing in section 1714 precludes a court from implementing a scheme of comparative incompetence. In implementing Section 1714 of the Civil Code, it was not the Legislature's intention to separate the matters discussed therein from further judicial creation.
* Some questions exist about the implementation of a framework of comparable incompetence. The gravest problem occurs because not all liable parties are put to the judge. Contribution and payment issues lurk in the context. The management of truth checking is a second problem. Confronted with hard evidence it can be difficult to assign a particular percentage figure. The third area of focus is with last-class simple chance theories and risk inference. If real comparative negligence is introduced, then the last reasonable chance doctrine is not used, as it would only give the complainant a windfall. Adopting a method of comparative negligence would entail integrating the protection of risk assumption into the general scheme of liability determination in relation to the damage, in such situations where the type of risk assumption is simply a form of contributory negligence. The last problem is of deliberate misconduct.

* Two of the areas of interest mentioned here (multiple parties and deliberate misconduct) are not present. In potential situations, these fields should be determined better. This case should be seen as a first step towards what is perceived to be a fair and just way.

* California embraces the "normal" model of comparative neglect as applied to the method of "50 percent." In all cases, in the purest form of comparative incompetence, responsibility is assigned in strict proportion to the error. In the 50 percent rule, responsibility is divided up to the extent that the guilt of the complainant is equal or greater than that of the defendant, depending on blame. In the 50 percent rule, if the fault of the complainant is equal to or greater than that of the defendant, the complainant shall be barred from compensation.

* The comparative negligence scheme will apply in all cases where the jury has not yet concluded.

Competition. Justice Mosk and Justice McComb agreed and were partially dissenting.

* (Justice Mosk) Justice Mosk denied that comparative incompetence would be valid in all cases where the court has not yet concluded.

* (Justice McComb) Justice McComb found that section 1714 codified the common law concept of contributory responsibility and could be replaced only by other legislation.

Conclusion.

The court upheld the decision, ruling that California should follow the "true" form of comparative negligence in place of the concept of contributory negligence. The court rationalized the Cal. Law. Law. In the case of contributory negligence, Code § 1714 does not prohibit legal intervention. Therefore, since the plaintiff added to the incident, the defendant may be found responsible for his liability part. The damages awarded, however, had to be limited in proportion to the degree of wrongdoing due to the plaintiff.