In: Psychology
As interest has risen in the study of foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, many scholars have grappled with the relevance of theories of international politics for examining the foreign policies or more appropriately, the external behavior of states. Realism, in all its variants, having been the dominant theory of world politics in the U.S.for half a century, has become a fashionable target of students of foreign policy. Even more so many apparent adherents to the realist school have sought to differentiate themselves from other realists. One can thus find classical realism, neorealism, and even neoclassical realism, defensive and offensive realism, among others. The debates thus far have suffered from the shortcomings of earlier debates: a misconception of the relation between realism, especially neorealism, and foreign policy, Ultimately, these works constitute neither alternative theories of international politics, nor refine ments of neorealism. Indeed, in many cases they present little conflict with neorealism.
Although Kenneth Waltz has been clear that his neorealist theory is not a theory of foreign policy, others continued to dispute him on this issue. Some realists have certainly contributed to the impression that realism, if not realism, explains foreign policy by seemingly suggesting that internal factors mattered little in the conduct of foreign policy. In one of the earlier debates with the radical left." Robert Tacker, for example, suggested that a socialist America would not behave significantly different from a capitalist America. As for Kenneth Waltz, however, his longest book was dedicated to second-image analysis, comparing British and American foreign policies. To say that socialism is not, or does not provide a theory of foreign pol icy does not mean that it has no consequence for the study of foreign policy. To say that relative power alone, or the drive for self-preservation alone, does nor shape the foreign policies of states not to say that a theory of foreign policy can ignore these factors. Even as a theory of international politics, neorealism is by no means comprehensive. This, Kenneth Waltz intended even in his earlier work: "The third image described the framework of world politics, bur without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results. Neorealism is therefore best conceived as a framework for further inquiry, not as the end of inquiry. The question is thus this: how does neorealism inform the study of foreign policy, even if it does not provide a theory of foreign policy? I will begin by analyzing what might be inferred from structural realism about state behavior, and proceed to evaluate some of the recent attempts to restate, or complement, its assumptions and propositions. Although structural realism is first and foremost a theory about outcomes of international interaction, one can infer some propositions about expected state behavior. There are essentially two arenas of relevance: opportunity and preferences. Neorealism says much about opportunity, and some, although less, about state preferences.
The one explicit assumption that neorealism books about states
prefer ences is that, above all, they seek self-preservation-an
assumption that has little to do with "defense" or "offense. This
is not to say that all states merely seek survival, or that some
states are not offensive-minded. It is simply a min implicit
assumption about the preferences of all states, no matter what else
they seek to attain. This minimal assumptions contrasts with Hans
Morgenthau's assumption that all states are power maximizers, and
Waltz argued that balances of power, as recurring outcomes of
international rela tions, could be derived without assuming that
all states seek to maximize material power. Although ultimately
material power matters, it is not an end in itself, but is an
instrument. As Zakaria notes, states seek to maximize influence,
not power:" or to put it differently, states seek to maximize
opportunity ties for implementing their preferences (whatever these
may be). But for neorealism, material power remains the most
effective measure, over time, of the degree of influence and
opportunity that states have.
So what is the relation between power, state preferences, and state
behavior? Although neorealism assumes only that all states seek
self-preservation, it also assumes that states have other
preferences, which may differ from one state to another. Otherwise,
capabilities would be merely an instrument of self-preservation,
which, once assured, would render relative gains useless. Since
most neorealists (certainly Waltz) assume that nuclear deterrence
(through a second-strike capability) gets as close as states are
likely to get to security in an anarchic world, one would wonder if
the Cold War was at all necessary for the U.S., which enjoyed
nuclear deterrence for most of that period.
Here the answers come, by inference, not by assumption. For Waltz, "the distribution of capabilities" is a component of system structure. Relative material power is conceived as the most important commodity of influence in an anarchic world. It is important for both self-preservation and for the degree of opportunity that states have in implementing their external preferences, beyond self-preservation What is the relation between increased opportunity and state preferences?
From neorealist propositions one can only deduce that increased
or decreased opportunity makes the attainment of states preferences
more or less possible. Across the system, and over time, one would
expect exploitation of increased opportunity. Zakaria notes
correctly, in addressing Jack Snyder's emphasis on interest-group
politics in expansionary policy, that success or failure of
expansion policies is a function of relative international power,
Overexpansion is correlated with relative power. Tucker made a
similar point much earlier arguing that "interests of states expand
roughly with their power." Further more, different distributions of
capabilities alter the preferences of states, which Jervis
described as "system effects."" But nowhere can one infer from
neorealism that the preferences of states are affected in the same
way by changes in relative power, or that states expand equally
given the same oppor tunity. Nothing short of an internal
examination of state preferences can reveal their motives. Zakaria
himself ultimately concludes that state strength is a significant
factor in accounting for the degree of actual expansion, given the
opportunity, because "what matters is state power, not national
power. How does such an approach provide an alternative, or a
refinement to neorealism? In a review article of recent books on
foreign policy, including Zakarias book, Gideon Rosen invents yet a
new term. "Neoclassical Realism," to describe an alternative to
neorealism. Rose notes correctly that ...Unfortunately there is no
simple, straightforward classical realism. Rather, the term covers
a host of authors who differ greatly from one another in
assumptions, objectives, and methodologies."
But Rose goes on to argue, not only that the four works he
considers provide "four theories of foreign policy" but that they
are alternatives to "defensive" and "offensive" realism., which he
acknowledges are theories of international relations but they
"commonly address foreign policy behavior and it is this aspect of
them that will be treated here". What makes these authors realists
is that they argue that the scope and ambition of a country's
foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the
inter national system; what makes them neoclassical is the belief
that the impact of capabilities on foreign policy is "indirect and
complex, because systemic pressure must be translated through
intervening variables at the unit level." Assuming that the
analyses of these authors do indeed constitute "theories" of
foreign policy, how can one present these theories as alternatives
to "aspects" of international relations theories? What does it
mean, theoreti cally, to say that "Neoclassical realists occupy a
space between pure structural theorists and constructivists?" One
is left to wonder.
In presenting theoretically informed case analysis, these authors are doing what a neorealist would expect from an investigation of foreign policy: explore the domestic basis of foreign policy while taking account of external factors. And they do a fine job of it. Thomas Christensen finds that Chinese leaders were limited in their ability to implement strategic policies by domes. tic constraints, which diminished their ability to mobilize necessary resources to implement these policies. Schweller argues that misperception of the dis tribution of power led Stalin to bandwagon with, instead of balancing Hitler, Zakaria concludes that state strength is a factor in the state's ability to exploit external opportunity. New theories of foreign policy requiring a new name! An alternative school to aspects" of realism? The problem here is the same as with all attempts at modifying "aspects of a theory such as substituting "influence" for power, balance of threat for balance of power, misperception of power for real power. The modification is fine if one is merely accounting for exceptions rather than the norm. One cannot begin with neorealist (or any other theoretical) assumptions, from which one would then derive logical conclusions that are then employed to challenge the assumption of the assumptions are wrong, the conclusions are wrong, and a new alternative theory, not only of foreign policy, but also of international relations must be provided. If states misperceive power some of the time, this poses little problems for neorealism. If perceived "threat sometimes does not correspond to real material power, it is hardly surprising, but it would still be helpful to differ entiate threat from power. If the level of "influence" is shown to occasionally deviate from the level of material power, then the distinction is helpful for explaining exceptions. If, on the other hand, one begins with a theory at the heart of which material power is the central variable, and arrives at the conclusion that such "deviant" behavior is the norm, then something is fundamentally wrong. The entire theory must be abandoned.
Material power is the primary variable for neorealism. It is the ultimate measure of influence. It may not be easily fungible, but the rules and norms of international behavior on most issues of interest to the powerful states are heavily biased toward them. If they are not, they can be ignored or changed. Power may be sometimes misperceived or misunderstood by governments, but for the theory to hold the inferences must always derive from material power. If balancing is the expected tendency of stares, it must be the balance ing of power, not perceptions of power or threat. Specifying threat as an alternative to power would be an entirely new theory of international polo tics, unless there was a high degree of correlation between power and threat. This is not to say that such concepts as "they" are not important in explaining international relations, as Stephen Walt docs very well in his work. It is hard to ignore that perceived threat sometimes has more impact on the behavior of states than objective power. But is it the basis for con cluding that states react by "balancing" threat, and what is the meaning of "balancing" if it is not measured by adding more objective power to one side? The expectation of balancing is derived precisely from the notion of material power, entailing equalization of power. How does one conclude that bulanc ing is the expected reaction to "threat." and what does one mean by balance ing in this case? In answering these questions, one would need an entirely different theory-not merely a modification of neorealism,
Foreign Policy Motives
To the extent that neorealism can account for some motives of states, it accounts for their basic drive to attain security and beyond that, to attain some relative power as an instrument for implementing a state's other motives. These other motives, which are essential in understanding any state's foreign policy, can have a number of sources that require different theories. Certainly, these can include domestic politics, ideology, leaders personal preferences, and moral considerations.
While neorealism has been often understood to ignore the role of
domestic politics in the formation of foreign policy, it has been
more often understood to leave no room for moral motives. Can
morality be a factor, sometimes even a dominant factor in a state's
foreign policy?
Given the external opportunity, neorealism certainly does not
preclude such a role. An example of a theory that envisions a
domestic context allow ing for such a role is Samuel Huntington's
notion of the American Creed and its impact on American foreign
policy. One does not have to agree with Huntington's particular
propositions about American foreign policy, but the point here is
that it is possible to conceive of domestic circumstances pro
pelling a role for national or subnational values in foreign
policy-given the international opportunity, which, for neorealism,
is usually abundant for powerful states. Indeed, some of the
dominant approaches to American politics envision a dominant role
for interest groups that are often driven by group (though not
always national) values, such as the Christian Right, to name but
one. Even ethnic groups in America (Polish, Jewish, Cuban, Arab)
are driven less by their own domestic political and economic
interests and more by group values when they advocate particular
foreign policies toward their ancestral homelands. Nothing in
neorealism precludes a theory, or an empirical finding, linking
moral factors and the external behav ior of states. Although this
point is misunderstood even by some of the adherents of neorealism,
the bigger misunderstanding in international debate has to do with
the connection between description and prescrip tion, the "ought"
and the "is" in neorealist and realist, more generally)
theorizing.
Much of the criticism of neorealism assumes that the national interest that one describes is the same that one prescribes. Realists are often said to argue that there is not and cannot be a moral relationship among states.This presumed realist position is then explained as a theoretical preference" that emerged following World War II and the beginning of the Cold War by theorists like Hans Morgenthau who escaped Hitler's Germany, and that American policy-makers "swallowed realism hook, line, and sinker" So now that we have a new generation of theorists and the Cold War has ended, new theoretical preferences should emerge.
This broad postulation of realism and neorealism particularly, is at odds with the way in which neorealism is conceived by its adherents: as descriptive enterprise explaining the way the world is organized, not as a prescriptive giving states advice on what to do.
At the descriptive level, morality can certainly be a factor in
shaping the motives of states, aside from the attainment of
security. Ar the prescriptive level, no logic of neorealism
prevents a neorealist who is engaged in a foreign policy debate, or
deciding on supporting a political cause or a political candidate
from supporting or prescribing a moral course-even in areas where
neorealism expects amoral state behavior. One often supports
failing.
causes, not merely for one's own internal pleasures, but also for
the chance that the case may be one of the numerous acknowledged
exceptions.
Policies of the Powerful and the Weak
One of the key issues about the relationship between relative power and the motives of states is the extent to which relative power provides opportu nighties for states to implement interests that are not security-related, or are not merely a drive for power itself. It is useful for this purpose to examine the different calculations of powerful and weak states after the end of the Cold War. For the world's sole remaining superpower, extraordinary opportunities emerged, and the role of domestic politics in the formation of foreign policy reached new heights. But the same could not be said for smaller powers. Certainly, neorealism could not predict even post-Cold War American behavior associated most closely with security policy: the American intervention to liberate Kuwait, and the survival and expansion of NATO. Here I will not address the latter case since others are doing so in this volume.
Instead, I will limit my empirical discussion to the analysis of the former case as an example of post-Cold War U.S. behavior and the reaction of weaker states in the Middle East to this behavior. No one seriously suggested that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait presented a military threat to the U.S. The primary interest-driven argument on behalf of the American military response was that the invasion threatened the sta bility, and thus pricing of oil supplies, which are vital to Western economies. This too has been the argument for the ultimate increase in the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf following the Iraq-Kuwait war:
Yer, even pure calculations of direct benefits and costs undermine the validity of this argument. The U.S. spends more than $50 billion a year on military presence and planning each year. What does the U.S. get in return for this investment? Beyond individual anecdotal cases, there is no solid evi dance that U.S. military presence helps U.S. business, unlike what is assumed by regionalism theorists of imperialism. In 1989, the year before Iraq invaded Kuwait, European exports to the Middle East stood at $40.2 billion compared to $13.1 billion for the U.S.. In 1992, the year after the Gulf War, Europe's total exports was $57.2 billion compared to $19.9 billion for the U.S. This trend continued; in 2000, Europe exported $63.7 billion com pared to $23.0 billion for the U.S.
American dependency on Persian Gulf oil in particular, and on oil imports in general is also much less than those of Europe and Japan. So, at a minimum, there is a peculiar divergence of approach between the U.S. and its Western European allies that cannot simply be explained by the degree of dependence on oil.
Pure calculations of costs and benefits from oil are also telling. First, there is probably little connection between U.S. military presence and oil prices, as supply and demand are usually the biggest factors in oil pricing. Even if there was some connection between military presence and pricing, this rela tionship cannot possibly begin to account for the extent of the American commitment. In short, oil alone cannot explain the U.S. policy in the Gulf or the extent of U.S. military presence there. Similarly, it is useful to consider the notion that oil alone explained U.S. intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991 The assertion that U.S. political and military dominance in the region was necessary to secure the flow of oil is challenged by considerable evidence about patterns of trade in the Middle East; states in the region sell oil and import goods independent of ideology, because markets tend to be their guide. The behavior of Japan and some European allies, considerably more depend ent on oil than the U.S.. was illustrative here to. Their early reluc tance to support a military initiative against Iraq, even with the U.S. carrying the bulk of the burden, generated American resentment. If interest in oil logically entailed Western intervention, how can this behavior be explained?
Conclusion
Neorealism has much to say about foreign policy, but does not provide a the ory of foreign policy. The drive for security, so essential in neorealist theory, and the importance of relative power in explaining the degree of opportunity that states have in the conduct of foreign policy are important factors in understanding any state's foreign policy. Moreover, to the extent that relative power is seen as a primary instrument of policy, the accumulation of power is also a motive, although not equally pursued by all states. But power and security alone cannot explain the varied motives of states, especially the pow erful among them who have ample international opportunity. And without a theory that explains the motives of states, including the motives of their constituent components, it is not possible for neorealism to explain the specific foreign policies of most states.