Question

Critically analyse the validity of the median voter theory.

Answer 1

Answer-The median voter theory states that "a majority rule voting system will select the outcome most preferred by the median voter". It is associated with public choice economics.

The median voter theorem rests on the following assumptions-

1. There is only one issue that is being voted on at a time.

2. Voters' preferences are single-peaked, which is just the notion that people's preferences have a spectrum of utility, and the strongest preference is at the maximum.

3.Voters are only choosing between two options.

4. There is no ideology or influence with regards to the voting options.

5.There is no ideology or influence with regards to the voting options.

6. All parties of elections have full information.

Let us now analyse the validity of this theorem with the help of some limitations-

Abstract social choice problem- Cycling-

The median voter model starts with the idea that aggregate preferences of all members of society ultimately, provides an answer for what outcome is most preferred. This choice rests on three main principles -

(1) weak Pareto efficiency or unanimity. This is the idea that if all voters prefer one choice to all other choices, the social decision should reflect this and this option will be the outcome.

(2) transitivity, which means that if option A is preferred to option B, and option B is preferred to option C, then option A is preferred to option C.

(3) independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) suggests that if something is not relevant to the election or the issues involved, then it should not affect the outcome or results.

If any of the above-mentioned principles is violated, it could result in cycling. Cycling happens when there is no clear winner from a majority vote that results in a constant cycle of trying to determine which outcome is most preferred. This is a crucial because it exposes how majority voting in general and the median voter theorem can fail when assumptions are not met.

Arrow's impossibility theorem-

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that there is no general solution to the abstract social choice problem which is based on ranked preferences . Arrow found that the only way for the social choice problem to have any consistent solution is to assume individual preferences fit some particular pattern or impose a dictatorship or accept a rule that violates IIA.The Median voter theorem is an example of the first option i.e. individual preferences do not fit some particular pattern so the social choice problem to have no consistent solution.

Two common solutions-

Common solutions always restrict preferences to single peaks and allow the median voter theorem to be implemented naturally. This is essentially the function of the party system mentioned briefly above. Another common solution is to allow people's intensities on issues play a factor in their vote. This is difficult to achieve since both social welfare functions and the Samuelson rule are necessary to calculate.

Political-

One assumption the median voter theorem makes is that there is only single dimensional voting. This is never true of government representatives – politicians do not only take stances on only one issue but rather several. If the median voter theorem holds, it would mean that the two senators from a state should vote the same way every time because the median voter in the state would be the voter that chooses the outcome. However, when there is one Democratic senator and one Republican senator, they typically vote opposite to each other, effectively canceling each other's votes.

Another larger problem for the median voter theorem is the incentives structure for government representatives. The government system as well, because it is composed of individuals who are self-interested. One cannot guarantee the degree to which a government representative will be committed to the public good, but it is certain that, to some degree, they will be committed to their own set of goals. To continue obtaining these things, then, officials must secure re-election. When representatives are constantly focused on becoming re-elected, this distorts the mandate they receive from their constituents: representatives will translate the wishes of their constituents into benefits for themselves. They will tend to vote for short-term policies that they hope will get them reelected.