a) Historical events led to the discovery of
water-borne pathogens
The Waterborne Disease and
Outbreak Surveillance System (WBDOSS) has tracked
water-borne disease outbreaks since the 1970s. The system collects
information on when and where the outbreak occurred, the source of
contamination, the agent(s) that caused the illness, the number of
people who got sick, and the demographic characteristics and
symptoms documented on standardized
forms. These data have
been routinely
reported and informs the
development of Drinking Water
Regulations and Recreational Water
Regulations.
1920s
- Waterborne disease reporting began in the United States. Some
health departments tracked outbreaks before that time.
1970-1979
1971
- CDC, EPA, and CSTE launch the national Waterborne Disease and
Outbreak Surveillance System (WBDOSS).
- Foodborne and waterborne disease outbreaks reported to the same
surveillance system.
- Waterborne outbreak defined as two or more cases
epidemiologically linked to consumption of water from municipal,
semi-public, or individual drinking water systems.
- Individual water system defined as wells or springs used
exclusively by single residences in areas without municipal
systems.
1974
- Added single cases of chemical poisoning (when public health
investigation indicated that drinking water was contaminated by a
chemical).
- First record of recreational water-associated Pontiac fever
involving exposure to a whirlpool.
1976
- Redefined individual water systems as wells or springs used by
single or several residences or by persons traveling outside
populated areas (for example, backpackers).
1978
- Recreational waterborne outbreaks added, which included
infections or intoxications but excluded wound infections.
- Foodborne and waterborne outbreaks moved to separate
surveillance systems and started reporting separately.
1979
- Redefined drinking water systems as community systems,
noncommunity systems, and individual systems (1976 definition for
individual system)
1980-1989
- First record of Pseudomonas dermatitis related to
whirlpools (hot tub infection)
1981
- Defined recreational water outbreaks as illnesses due to
exposure or unintentional ingestion of fresh or marine water
(excluded wound infections).
1988
- MMWR publishes first outbreak surveillance summary on June 1,
1988
- First reported outbreak of Cryptosporidium associated
with recreational water.
1989
- Redefined total number of cases to exclude secondary cases
- Added single cases of lab-confirmed primary amebic
meningoencephalitis
- Redefined recreational water outbreaks to include illnesses due
to inhalation of contaminated water
- Added outbreaks of Pontiac fever associated with whirlpools
(excluded outbreaks of Legionnaires’ disease)
1990-1999
1991
- Excluded outbreaks caused by contamination of water or ice at
point-of-use. These were categorized as foodborne outbreaks
- Redefined recreational water outbreaks to include outbreaks in
swimming pools and whirlpools (beyond whirlpool/hot tub
dermatitis)
1995
- Prioritized using the estimated case count instead of the
actual case count when the study population was randomly sampled or
the estimated count was calculated using the attack rate
1999
- Added outbreaks associated with occupational uses of water
- Redefined individual water systems to include water not
intended for drinking and bottled water
- Redefined recreational water outbreak to include outbreaks in
wading pools and interactive fountains
2000-2009
2001
- CDC launched the Healthy Swimming Program
- Published drinking and recreational water outbreak surveillance
summaries separately
- Redefined recreational water outbreak to specify that the
epidemiologic evidence must implicate either recreational water or
the recreational water setting as the probable source of
illness
- Added recreational water air quality events and single cases of
recreational water-associated wound infections
- Added Legionnaires’ disease outbreaks. Previously, only Pontiac
fever outbreaks were included
2003
- Redefined deficiency classification to include additional
categories that capture waterborne outbreaks due to point-of-use
contamination (except ice contamination)
- Revised definition of etiologic agent to list multiple
etiologies when each agent individually represented > 5% of
positive specimens
- Redefined illness types to list all types if more than 50% of
cases reported a symptom in that category
2005
- Expanded the deficiency classifications for drinking water to
include deficiency 13 (Treatment process not expected to remove a
chemical contaminant)
- Analyzed single cases of illness (e.g., Naegleria fowleri,
Vibrio, and chemicals for recreational water, and bottled
water for drinking water) separately from waterborne
outbreaks.
2006
- EPA used surveillance summary data to support development of
the 2006 Ground Water Rule (GWR)
2007
- CDC launched the Model Aquatic Health Code initiative based on
data from outbreak surveillance
- Revised the criteria used to determine the strength-of-evidence
classifications to include molecular epidemiology along with
traditional epidemiology
- Added data from legionellosis outbreaks that occurred prior to
2001
2009
- Implemented electronic outbreak reporting through the
National Outbreak Reporting System
(NORS). This replaced paper-based outbreak reporting
conducted since 1971.
- Created the “Other Non-recreational Water” category to replace
two previously reported categories: “Water Not Intended for
Drinking” and “Water of Unknown Intent.” This category includes
outbreaks not associated with public or private drinking water
systems, as well as outbreaks for which the intended use of the
water is not known. The category does not include outbreaks
associated with recreational water venues (e.g., swimming pools),
which are reported separately.
- Assigned multiple deficiency categories to Legionella
outbreaks for the first time, to better describe factors
contributing to these outbreaks
- For the first time, the majority of outbreaks associated with
drinking water systems were caused by Legionella.
b) Municipal drinking water disinfection method led
to significant reductions in water-borne pathogenic diseases in
cities
The goal
of disinfection of public water supplies is the elimination of the
pathogens that are responsible for waterborne diseases. The
transmission of diseases such as typhoid and paratyphoid fevers,
cholera, salmonellosis, and shigellosis can be controlled with
treatments that substantially reduce the total number of viable
microorganisms in the water.
While
the concentration of organisms in drinking water after effective
disinfection may be exceedingly small, sterilization (i.e., killing
all the microbes present) is not attempted. Sterilization
is not only impractical, it cannot be maintained in the
distribution system. Assessment of the reduction in microbes that
is sufficient to protect against the transmission of pathogens in
water is discussed below.
Chlorination is the
most widely used method for disinfecting water supplies in the
United States. The near universal adoption of this method can be
attributed to its convenience and to its highly satisfactory
performance as a disinfectant, which has been established by
decades of use. It has been so successful that freedom from
epidemics of waterborne diseases is now virtually taken for
granted. As stated in Drinking Water and Health (National
Academy of Sciences, 1977), "chlorination is the standard of
disinfection against which others are compared."
However,
the discovery that chlorination can result in the formation of
trihalomethanes (THM's) and other halogenated hydrocarbons has
prompted the reexamination of available disinfection methodology to
determine alternative agents or procedures .
The
method of choice for disinfecting water for human consumption
depends on a variety of factors. These include:
- its efficacy against waterborne pathogens (bacteria, viruses,
protozoa, and helminths);
- the accuracy with which the process can be monitored and
controlled;
- its ability to produce a residual that provides an added
measure of protection against possible posttreatment contamination
resulting from faults in the distribution system;
- the aesthetic quality of the treated water; and
- the availability of the technology for the adoption of the
method on the scale that is required for public water
supplies.
Economic
factors will also play a part in the final decision; however, this
study is confined to a discussion of the five factors listed above
as they apply to various disinfectants.
C) The main disadvantage
Free Chlorine (HOCl and OCl-)
Butterfield et
al. (1943) studied percentages of inactivation as functions of
time for E. coli, Enterobacter aerogenes, Pseudomonas
aeruginosa, Salmonella typhi, and Shigella
dysenteriae. They used different levels of free chlorine at pH
values ranging from 7.0 to 10.7 and two temperature ranges—2°C to
5°C and 20°C to 25°C. Their work is of great importance, since very
few other studies have been conducted that dealt with the action of
disinfectants on pathogens. Generally, they found that the primary
factors governing the bactericidal efficacy of free available
chlorine and combined available chlorine were:
- the time of contact between the bacteria and the bactericidal
agent, i.e., the longer the time, the more effective the chlorine
disinfection process;
- the temperature of the water in which contact is made, i.e.,
the lower the temperature, the less effective the chlorine
disinfecting activity; and
- the pH of the water in which contact is made, i.e., the higher
the pH, the less effective chlorination.
Thus,
the test bacteria will be killed more rapidly at lower pH values
and at higher temperatures. Since hypochlorous acid would
predominate at lower pH's (Figure
II-1), the data of Butterfield et al. show that it
is a better bactericide than the hypochlorite ion. For example, to
produce a 100% inactivation of an initial inoculum of 8 × 105
E. coli in 400 ml of sterile chlorine demand-free water
(2,000/ml) at 20°C-25°C with a chlorine level of 0.046 to 0.055
mg/liter, 1.0 min was required at pH 7.0, but at pH 8.5, 9.8, and
10.7, between 20 and 60 min of exposure were needed. At higher
concentrations of chlorine, i.e., from 0.1 to 0.29 mg/liter,
exposure of 1.0 min was required at pH 7.0, 10 min at pH 8.5, 20
min at 9.8, and 60 min at 10.7. A similar pH effect was noted for
S. typhi.