Two firms in an oligopoly compete as a leader and follower (the standard two-firm Stackelberg model)....

Two firms in an oligopoly compete as a leader and follower (the standard two-firm Stackelberg model). The market demand is represented by the equation:

p = 6500 - 25Q.

Each firm has constant MC = AC = 500 (with no fixed costs).

What will be the follower's profit? (Round answer to nearest whole number

Expert Solution

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Rahul Sunny answered 2 years ago

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