In: Economics
An industry has three firms each of which produces output at a constant unit cost of $10 per unit. The demand function for the industry is q= 200-p. Firms compete in price in a Bertrand game
P = 200 - 2Q Where Q is total industry output.
The market is occupied by two firms, each with constant marginal costs equal to $10
Calculate the equilibrium price and quantity assuming the two firms compete in quantities.
Now, we need to actually go through the steps: Assume that firm one’s cost is $10.
P = 200 - 2q2 - 2q1
Total revenues equal price times quantity.
2 Pq1 = 200 - 2q2 q1 - 2q1
Marginal revenue is the derivative with respect to quantity.
MR = 200 - 2q2 - 4q1
Set marginal revenue
equal to marginal cost and solve for quantity. To get market price, remember there are two firms.
(200-2q2)-4q1=10
Q1 = (190-2q2)/4 = 47.5-0.5q2
This is firm one’s best response function. Note that firm two has the same problem to solve, but with MC =$8
Q1 = 47.5-0.5q2
Q2 = 48 – 0.5q1
Solving these two,
Q1 =31.3
Q2 = 32.3
P = 78.8
Note that firm 2 exploits firm one’s cost increase by grabbing market share
Assuming the competition is in prices rather than quantities, with identical products, both firms charge a price equal to marginal cost (in this case, $8) and profits are zero. If firm one’s costs rise to $10, firm 2 charges a price equal to $9.99, takes the entire market and earns profits equal to ($9.99 - $8)(95) = $189.